Central Bank Autonomy, and Inflation and Output Performance in the Baltic States, Russia, and Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union, 1995-1997
AbstractA higher degree of de jure autonomy and accountability of the central banks of the Baltic states, Russia, and other countries of the former Soviet Union appears to be positively correlated with lower average inflation. There also seems to be some positive correlation between greater central bank autonomy and higher average real growth, after the initial period of reforms. Central banks with a higher degree of autonomy and accountability have apparently also reformed their operations more aggressively.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 99/4.
Date of creation: 01 Jan 1999
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA
Phone: (202) 623-7000
Fax: (202) 623-4661
Web page: http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm
More information through EDIRC
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CIS-2013-02-16 (Confederation of Independent States)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Clive Briault & Andrew Haldane & Mervyn King, 1996. "Independence and Accountability," Bank of England working papers, Bank of England 49, Bank of England.
- Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May.
- Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March.
- Wolfgang HÄRDLE & J. MARRON & L. YANG, 1996. "Discussion," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1996,65, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
- Cukierman Alex, 1992.
"Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, And Independance: Theory And Evidence,"
Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter,
De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 10, December.
- Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, December.
- Eijffinger, Sylvester & van Rooij, Maarten & Schaling, Eric, 1996.
" Central Bank Independence: A Paneldata Approach,"
Public Choice, Springer,
Springer, vol. 89(1-2), pages 163-82, October.
- Eijffinger, S. & van Rool, M. & Schaling, E., 1994. "Central Bank Independence: A Panel Data Approach," Papers, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research 9493, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Rooij, M. van & Schaling, E., 1994. "Central bank independence: A paneldata approach," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1994-93, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Rooij, M. van & Schaling, E., 1996. "Central Bank Independence: A Panel Data Approach," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-73023, Tilburg University.
- repec:wop:humbsf:1996-65 is not listed on IDEAS
- Cukierman, Alex, 1994. "Central Bank Independence and Monetary Control," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(427), pages 1437-48, November.
- Manfred Gärtner, 1997. "Central Bank Independence and the Sacrifice Ratio: The Dark Side of the Force," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 133(III), pages 513-538, September.
- Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
- Andreas Fischer, 1996. "Central bank independence and sacrifice ratios," Open Economies Review, Springer, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 5-18, January.
- Mangano, Gabriel, 1998. "Measuring Central Bank Independence: A Tale of Subjectivity and of Its Consequences," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 468-92, July.
- Loungani, Prakash & Sheets, Nathan, 1997.
"Central Bank Independence, Inflation, and Growth in Transition Economies,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(3), pages 381-99, August.
- Prakash Loungani & Nathan Sheets, 1995. "Central bank independence, inflation and growth in transition economies," International Finance Discussion Papers, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) 519, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- International Monetary Fund, 1991. "Central Bank Independence," IMF Working Papers 91/58, International Monetary Fund.
- Dirk Schoenmaker, 1992. "Institutional Separation between Supervisory and Monetary Agencies," FMG Special Papers, Financial Markets Group sp52, Financial Markets Group.
- Helge Berger & Volker Nitsch & Tonny Lybek, 2007.
"Central Bank Boards around the World: Why does Membership Size Differ?,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
1897, CESifo Group Munich.
- Berger, Helge & Nitsch, Volker & Lybek, Tonny, 2008. "Central bank boards around the world: Why does membership size differ?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 817-832, December.
- Berger, Helge & Nitsch, Volker & Lybek, Tonny, 2008. "Central Bank boards around the world: why does membership size differ?," Discussion Papers 2008/5, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jim Beardow) or (Hassan Zaidi).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.