Bank Bailouts: Moral Hazard vs. Value Effect

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Bank Bailouts: Moral Hazard vs. Value Effect

Author Info

Tito Cordella
Eduardo Levy Yeyati

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Abstract

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Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 99/106.

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Date of creation: 01 Aug 1999
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Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:99/106

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Related research
Keywords: Banking ; Central bank role ;

Other versions of this item:

Article
- Cordella, Tito & Yeyati, Eduardo Levy, 2003. "Bank bailouts: moral hazard vs. value effect," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 300-330, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Sophie Claeys, & Gleb Lanine & Koen Schoors, 2005. "Bank Supervision Russian style: Rules versus Enforcement and Tacit Objectives," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp778, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Claeys, Sophie & Lanine, Gleb & Schoors, Koen, 2005. "Bank supervision Russian style: Rules versus enforcement and tacit objectives," BOFIT Discussion Papers 10/2005, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition. [Downloadable!]
Itai Agur, 2009. "What Institutional Structure for the Lender of Last Resort?," DNB Working Papers 200, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
Claeys, Sophie & Schoors, Koen, 2007. "Bank supervision Russian style: Evidence of conflicts between micro- and macroprudential concerns," Working Paper Series 205, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden). [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Claeys, Sophie & Schoors, Koen, 2007. "Bank supervision Russian style: Evidence of conflicts between micro- and macro-prudential concerns," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 630-657, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Tito Cordella & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2004. "Country Insurance," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 290, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Tito Cordella & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2004. "Country Insurance," Business School Working Papers countryinsurance, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. [Downloadable!]
- Tito Cordella & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2004. "Country Insurance," IMF Working Papers 04/148, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
- Eduardo Levy Yeyati & Tito Cordella, 2004. "Country Insurance," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 136, Econometric Society.
- Tito Cordella & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2005. "Country Insurance," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan Journals, vol. 52(si), pages 6. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
S. CLAEYS & G. LANINE & K. SCHOORs, 2005. "Bank Supervision Russian Style: Rules vs Enforcement and Tacit Objectives," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 05/307, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
Gabriel Jiménez & Steven Ongena & José Luis Peydró & Jesús Saurina, 2009. "Hazardous times for monetary policy: What do twenty-three million bank loans say about the effects of monetary policy on credit risk-taking?," Banco de EspaÃ±a Working Papers 0833, Banco de España. [Downloadable!]
Koen Schoors & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "Passive Creditors," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp737, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- K. Schoors & K. Sonin, 2003. "Passive Creditors," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 03/177, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
- Koen Schoors & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "Passive Creditors," Working Papers w0015, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
- Schoors, Koen & Sonin, Konstantin, 2004. "Passive Creditors," CEPR Discussion Papers 4821, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Koen Schoors & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "Passive Creditors," International Finance, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 8(1), pages 57-86, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Erlenmaier, Ulrich & Gersbach, Hans, 2001. "The Funds Concentration Effect and Discriminatory Bailout," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Tito Cordella & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2005. "A (New) Country Insurance Facility," IMF Working Papers 05/23, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Tito Cordella y Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2005. "A (New) Country Insurance Facility," Business School Working Papers newcountryins, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. [Downloadable!]
- Tito Cordella & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2006. "A (New) Country Insurance Facility," International Finance, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 9(1), pages 1-36, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2004. "Recurrent Debt Problems and International Safety Nets," Business School Working Papers safetynets, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. [Downloadable!]
Ashoka Mody & Se-Jik Kim, 2005. "Managing Confidence in Emerging Market Bank Runs," IMF Working Papers 04/235, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
Rafael Repullo, 2005. "Liquidity, Risk-Taking, And The Lender Of Last Resort," Working Papers wp2005_0504, CEMFI. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Repullo, Rafael, 2005. "Liquidity, Risk Taking, and the Lender of Last Resort," MPRA Paper 826, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
- Repullo, Rafael, 2005. "Liquidity, Risk-Taking and the Lender of Last Resort," CEPR Discussion Papers 4967, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Rafael Repullo, 2005. "Liquidity, Risk Taking, and the Lender of Last Resort," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 1(2), September. [Downloadable!]
Mundaca, B. Gabriela, 2007. "Monitoring, liquidity provision and financial crisis," Memorandum 04/2007, Oslo University, Department of Economics, revised 01 Mar 2009. [Downloadable!]

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