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Vertical Tax Externalities in the Theory of Fiscal Federalism

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Author Info
Michael Keen

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 97/173.

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Date of creation: 01 Dec 1997
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Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:97/173

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Related research
Keywords: Fiscal policy ; Taxation ; Tax policy ; Economic models ;

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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Roy Bahl & Sally Wallace, 2004. "Intergovernmental Transfers: The Vertical Sharing Dimension," International Studies Program Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0419, International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
  2. Esteller-Moré, Álex & Solé-Ollé, Albert, 1999. "Vertical income tax externalities and fiscal interdependence : evidence from the US," ZEW Discussion Papers 99-28, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Marcel Gérard & Fernando Ruiz, 2006. "Interjurisdictional Competition for Higher Education and Firms," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  4. Toshihiro Ihori, 2008. "Overlapping Tax Revenue, Local Debt Control and Soft-Budget Constraint," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-552, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  5. Robin Boadway & Jean-Francois Tremblay, 2005. "A Theory of Vertical Fiscal Imbalance," Working Papers 2006-04, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Rangarajan, C. & Srivastava, D.K., 2004. "Fiscal transfer in Canada: Drawing comparisons and lessons," Working Papers 04/18, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy. [Downloadable!]
  7. Julia Darby & Anton Muscatelli & Graeme Roy, 2004. "Fiscal Federalism, Fiscal Consolidations and Cuts in Central Government Grants: Evidence from an Event Study," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Rizzo, Leonzio, 2007. "Interaction between vertical and horizontal tax competition: evidence and some theory," MPRA Paper 8632, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2008. [Downloadable!]
  9. Michael Keen, 1997. "Peculiar institutions: A British perspective on tax policy in the United States," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 18(4), pages 371-400, November. [Downloadable!]
  10. Marko Koethenbuerger, 2003. "Tax Competition in a Fiscal Union with Decentralized Leadership," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Julia Darby & Anton Muscatelli & Graeme Roy, 2002. "Fiscal federalism and Fiscal Autonomy: Lessons for the UK from other Industrialised Countries," Working Papers 2002_12, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow. [Downloadable!]
  12. Revelli Federico, 2002. "Reaction or interaction? Spatial process identification in multi-tiered government structures," Department of Economics Working Papers 200202, University of Turin. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Daniel Berkowitz and David N. DeJong & Daniel Berkowitz and David N. DeJong, 1999. "Accounting for Growth in Post-Soviet Russia," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 256, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Julia Darby & V. Anton Muscatelli & Graeme Roy, . "Fiscal Federalism and Fiscal Consolidation: Evidence from an Event Study," Working Papers 2005_21, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow, revised Jun 2005. [Downloadable!]
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