Central Bank Independence
AbstractThis paper extends the analysis of central bank independence to a model in which there is more than one policymaker. It shows that the degree of central bank independence as generally defined in the existing theoretical literature is only one of the influences on macroeconomic performance. The objectives of the fiscal authority, the commitment mechanisms available to the authorities and the nature of the policy game play a key role in determining the inflation rate and output in the economy. Furthermore, the model can be solved for the optimal degree of inflation aversion of the central bank. , a Working Paper and the authors) would welcome any comments on the present text Citations should refer to a Working Paper of the International Monetary Fund, mentioning the authors), and the date of issuance. The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the Fund.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 96/1.
Date of creation: 01 Jan 1996
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA
Phone: (202) 623-7000
Fax: (202) 623-4661
Web page: http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm
More information through EDIRC
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Hossein Samiei & Jan Kees Martijn, 1999. "Central Bank Independence and the Conduct of Monetary Policy in the United Kingdom," IMF Working Papers 99/170, International Monetary Fund.
- Paul Cavelaars, 2000. "Double Discretion, International Spillovers and the Welfare Implications of Monetary Unification," MEB Series (discontinued) 2000-12, Netherlands Central Bank, Monetary and Economic Policy Department.
- Aleksandra Maslowska, 2007. "Discussion on the Inconsistency of Central Bank Independence Measures," Discussion Papers 21, Aboa Centre for Economics.
- Diana N. Weymark, 2001. "Inflation, Income Redistribution, and Optimal Central Bank Independence," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0102, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Loungani, Prakash & Sheets, Nathan, 1997.
"Central Bank Independence, Inflation, and Growth in Transition Economies,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(3), pages 381-99, August.
- Prakash Loungani & Nathan Sheets, 1995. "Central bank independence, inflation and growth in transition economies," International Finance Discussion Papers 519, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Diana N. Weymark, 2005. "Inflation, Government Transfers, and Optimal Central Bank Independence," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0502, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1998.
"The optimality of a monetary union without a fiscal union,"
1998-81, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Beetsma, Roel M W J & Bovenberg, A Lans, 2001. "The Optimality of a Monetary Union without a Fiscal Union," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 33(2), pages 179-204, May.
- Beetsma, Roel & Bovenberg, A Lans, 1998. "The Optimality of a Monetary Union Without a Fiscal Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 1975, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Lossani, Marco & Natale, Piergiovanna & Tirelli, Patrizio, 2000.
"Fiscal Policy and Inflation Targets: Does Credibility Matters?,"
18693, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Lossani Marco & Natale Piergiovanna & Tirelli Patrizio, 2001. "Fiscal Policy and Inflation Targets: Does Credibility Matter?," Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 371-392.
- Mark P. Taylor & Lucio Sarno, 2001.
"Official Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market: Is It Effective and, If So, How Does It Work?,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 39(3), pages 839-868, September.
- Sarno, Lucio & Taylor, Mark P, 2001. "Official Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market: Is It Effective, and, If So, How Does It Work?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2690, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- de Jong, Eelke, 2002. "Why are price stability and statutory independence of central banks negatively correlated? The role of culture," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 675-694, November.
- Pierre Faure, 2003. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Games and Effects of Institutional Differences between the European Union and the Rest of the World," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 54(5), pages 937-959.
- W. Bolt, 1999. "Fiscal Restraints, ECB Credibility and the Stability Pact:A Game-Theoretic Perspective," DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) 38, Netherlands Central Bank.
- Haizhou Huang & A. Jorge Padilla, 2002. "Fiscal Policy and the Implementation of the Walsh Contract for Central Bankers," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 3(1), pages 27-42, May.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jim Beardow) or (Hassan Zaidi).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.