Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Central Bank Independence

Contents:

Author Info

  • Guy Debelle

Abstract

This paper extends the analysis of central bank independence to a model in which there is more than one policymaker. It shows that the degree of central bank independence as generally defined in the existing theoretical literature is only one of the influences on macroeconomic performance. The objectives of the fiscal authority, the commitment mechanisms available to the authorities and the nature of the policy game play a key role in determining the inflation rate and output in the economy. Furthermore, the model can be solved for the optimal degree of inflation aversion of the central bank. , a Working Paper and the authors) would welcome any comments on the present text Citations should refer to a Working Paper of the International Monetary Fund, mentioning the authors), and the date of issuance. The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the Fund.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=1960
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 96/1.

as in new window
Length: 24
Date of creation: 01 Jan 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:96/1

Contact details of provider:
Postal: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA
Phone: (202) 623-7000
Fax: (202) 623-4661
Email:
Web page: http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/pubs/ord_info.htm

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Mark P. Taylor & Lucio Sarno, 2001. "Official Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market: Is It Effective and, If So, How Does It Work?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(3), pages 839-868, September.
  2. Diana N. Weymark, 2005. "Inflation, Government Transfers, and Optimal Central Bank Independence," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0502, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  3. Loungani, Prakash & Sheets, Nathan, 1997. "Central Bank Independence, Inflation, and Growth in Transition Economies," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(3), pages 381-99, August.
  4. Hossein Samiei & Jan Kees Martijn, 1999. "Central Bank Independence and the Conduct of Monetary Policy in the United Kingdom," IMF Working Papers 99/170, International Monetary Fund.
  5. W. Bolt, 1999. "Fiscal Restraints, ECB Credibility and the Stability Pact:A Game-Theoretic Perspective," DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) 38, Netherlands Central Bank.
  6. Aleksandra Maslowska, 2007. "Discussion on the Inconsistency of Central Bank Independence Measures," Discussion Papers 21, Aboa Centre for Economics.
  7. Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1998. "The optimality of a monetary union without a fiscal union," Discussion Paper 1998-81, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  8. Lossani, Marco & Natale, Piergiovanna & Tirelli, Patrizio, 2000. "Fiscal Policy and Inflation Targets: Does Credibility Matters?," MPRA Paper 18693, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Pierre Faure, 2003. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Games and Effects of Institutional Differences between the European Union and the Rest of the World," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 54(5), pages 937-959.
  10. Paul Cavelaars, 2000. "Double Discretion, International Spillovers and the Welfare Implications of Monetary Unification," MEB Series (discontinued) 2000-12, Netherlands Central Bank, Monetary and Economic Policy Department.
  11. Haizhou Huang & A. Jorge Padilla, 2002. "Fiscal Policy and the Implementation of the Walsh Contract for Central Bankers," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 3(1), pages 27-42, May.
  12. Diana N. Weymark, 2001. "Inflation, Income Redistribution, and Optimal Central Bank Independence," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0102, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  13. de Jong, Eelke, 2002. "Why are price stability and statutory independence of central banks negatively correlated? The role of culture," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 675-694, November.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:96/1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jim Beardow) or (Hassan Zaidi).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.