This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Flexible Estimation of Demand Schedules and Revenue under Different Auction Formats

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Robert Alan Feldman
Vincent Reinhart

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 95/116.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 10 Nov 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:95/116

Contact details of provider:
Postal: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA
Phone: (202) 623-7000
Fax: (202) 623-4661
Email:
Web page: http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/pubs/ord_info.htm

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords: Gold sales by Fund ; Demand ; Revenues ;

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Rafael Romeu & Lawrence Ausubel, 2005. "Bidder Participation and Information in Currency Auctions," IMF Working Papers 05/157, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  2. Robert Jörin & Yvan Lengwiler, 2004. "Learning from Financial Markets: Auctioning Tariff-Rate Quotas in Agricultural Trade," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 140(IV), pages 521-541, December. [Downloadable!]
  3. Goldreich, David, 2003. "Underpricing in Discriminatory and Uniform-Price Treasury Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 4105, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Orly Sade & Charles Schnitzlein & Jaime F. Zender, 2004. "Competition and Cooperation in Divisible Good Auctions: An Experimental Examination," Working Papers 2004.15, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  5. Koesrindartoto, Deddy P., 2004. "Treasury Auctions, Uniform or Discriminatory?: An Agent-Based Approach," Staff General Research Papers 11988, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Orly Sade & Charles Schnitzlein & Jaime Zender, 2006. "Competition and Cooperation in Divisible Good Auctions: An Experimental Examination," Artefactual Field Experiments 0076, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by providing information about publications in your institution.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-20.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.