Restraining Yourself: Fiscal Rules and Stabilization
AbstractState budgets in the United States played a significant macroeconomic role in the 1970s and 1980s, and the level of cyclical responsiveness was affected by the severity of statutory and constitutional fiscal restraints. Moving from no fiscal restraints to the most stringent restraints lowered the fiscal offset to income fluctuations by around 40%. Simulations indicate that a reduction in aggregate fiscal stabilizers of this size could lead to a significant increase in the variance of aggregate output.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 94/82.
Date of creation: 01 Jul 1994
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Other versions of this item:
- Bayoumi, Tamim & Eichengreen, Barry, 1994. "Restraining Yourself: Fiscal Rules and Stabilization," CEPR Discussion Papers 1029, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
- H74 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Borrowing
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- NEP-ALL-2013-02-16 (All new papers)
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