Treasury Bill Auctions
AbstractWe review the main issues that arise in the design of treasury bill auctions and survey the relevant empirical literature. We also provide a detailed description of the actual design of these auctions in a sample of 42 industrial and developing countries.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 94/135.
Date of creation: 01 Nov 1994
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- Giuseppe Lopomo & Leslie M. Marx & David McAdams & Brian Murray, 2011. "Carbon Allowance Auction Design: An Assessment of Options for the United States," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 5(1), pages 25-43, Winter.
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"Az aukciós módszer hatása a kincstár bevételére
[The impact of the auction method on the revenues of the Treasury]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(6), pages 506-524.
- Sara Castellanos, 2001. "Mexican treasury securities primary auctions," Theory workshop papers, UCLA Department of Economics 357966000000000025, UCLA Department of Economics.
- David McAdams & Giuseppe Lopomo & Leslie Marx & Brian Murray, . "Carbon Allowance Auction Design: An Assessment of Options for the U.S," Working Papers, Duke University, Department of Economics 10-64, Duke University, Department of Economics.
- Randall S. Kroszner, 1999. "Is the Financial System Politically Independent? Perspectives on the Political Economy of Banking and Financial Regulation," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State 151, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
- Sara Castellanos, 2001. "A New Empirical Study of the Mexican Treasury Securities Primary Auctions: Is there more underpricing?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000206, David K. Levine.
- Randall S. Kroszner, 1999. "Is the Financial System Politically Independent? Perspectives on the Political Economy of Banking and Financial Regulation," CRSP working papers, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago 492, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
- Singh, Bhupal & Dhal, Sarat C., 1998. "Repo auction formats, bidders' behaviour and money market response in India," MPRA Paper 12147, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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