Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Wholesale Bank Funding, Capital Requirements and Credit Rationing

Contents:

Author Info

  • Itai Agur

Abstract

This paper analyzes how different types of bank funding affect the extent to which banks ration credit to borrowers, and the impact that capital requirements have on that rationing. Using an extension of the standard Stiglitz-Weiss model of credit rationing, unsecured wholesale finance is shown to amplify the credit market impact of capital requirements as compared to funding by retail depositors. Unsecured finance surged in the pre-crisis years, but is increasingly replaced by secured funding. The collateralization of wholesale funding is found to expand the extent of credit rationing.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=40285
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 13/30.

as in new window
Length: 22
Date of creation: 31 Jan 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:13/30

Contact details of provider:
Postal: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA
Phone: (202) 623-7000
Fax: (202) 623-4661
Email:
Web page: http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/pubs/ord_info.htm

Related research

Keywords: Banks; Capital; Bank credit; Credit restraint; Economic models; bank funding; deposit insurance; bank risk; collateralization; banking; bank capital; bank loan; risk taking; bank loan rates; bank liabilities; bank funding rates; bank creditors; bank charter; bank financing; bank profits; bank debt; bank lending; bank assets; bank risk-taking; capital regulation; bank risk taking; bank regulation; bank balance sheets; bank management; imperfect information; bank portfolios; excess demand; bank finance; risk aversion; bank borrowers; bank defaults; bank activities; moral hazard;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Thakor, Anjan V, 1996. " Capital Requirements, Monetary Policy, and Aggregate Bank Lending: Theory and Empirical Evidence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(1), pages 279-324, March.
  2. Borio, Claudio & Zhu, Haibin, 2012. "Capital regulation, risk-taking and monetary policy: A missing link in the transmission mechanism?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 236-251.
  3. Adrian, Tobias & Song Shin, Hyun, 2010. "Financial Intermediaries and Monetary Economics," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 12, pages 601-650 Elsevier.
  4. Diana Hancock & James A. Wilcox, 1994. "Bank Capital and the Credit Crunch: The Roles of Risk-Weighted and Unweighted Capital Regulations," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 22(1), pages 59-94.
  5. Joseph G. Haubrich & Paul Wachtel, 1993. "Capital requirements and shifts in commercial bank portfolios," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q III, pages 2-15.
  6. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, 1994. "Did risk-based capital allocate bank credit and cause a "credit crunch" in the United States?," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 585-633.
  7. Agur, Itai & Demertzis, Maria, 2012. "Excessive bank risk taking and monetary policy," Working Paper Series 1457, European Central Bank.
  8. Hancock, Diana & Laing, Andrew J. & Wilcox, James A., 1995. "Bank capital shocks: Dynamic effects on securities, loans, and capital," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 661-677, June.
  9. Lown, Cara & Peristiani, Stavros, 1996. "The behavior of consumer loan rates during the 1990 credit slowdown," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(10), pages 1673-1694, December.
  10. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2009. "The Credit Crisis: Conjectures about Causes and Remedies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(2), pages 606-10, May.
  11. Peek, Joe & Rosengren, Eric, 1995. "The Capital Crunch: Neither a Borrower nor a Lender Be," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(3), pages 625-38, August.
  12. Charles Jacklin, 1993. "Bank capital requirements and incentives for lending," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 93-07, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  13. Altunbas, Yener & Gambacorta, Leonardo & Marqués-Ibáñez, David, 2009. "Bank risk and monetary policy," Working Paper Series 1075, European Central Bank.
  14. Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren, 1993. "Bank regulation and the credit crunch," Working Papers 93-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
  15. Maddaloni, Angela & Peydró, José-Luis, 2010. "Bank risk-taking, securitization, supervision and low interest rates: Evidence from the euro area and the U.S. lending standards," Working Paper Series 1248, European Central Bank.
  16. Ben S. Bernanke & Cara S. Lown, 1991. "The Credit Crunch," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 22(2), pages 205-248.
  17. Frederick T. Furlong, 1992. "Capital regulation and bank lending," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, pages 23-33.
  18. Charles J. Jacklin, 1993. "Bank capital requirements and incentives for lending," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Mar.
  19. R. Glenn Hubbard & Kenneth N. Kuttner & Darius N. Palia, 1999. "Are there "bank effects" in borrowers' costs of funds? Evidence from a matched sample of borrowers and banks," Staff Reports 78, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  20. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Ignacio Lozano & Alexander Guarín, 2014. "Fragilidad Bancaria en Colombia: Un Análisis Basado en las Hojas de Balance," Borradores de Economia 813, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
  2. Oana Peia & Radu Vranceanu, 2014. "Optimal Return in a Model of Bank Small-business Financing," Post-Print hal-00952641, HAL.
  3. Riccetti, Luca & Russo, Alberto & Mauro, Gallegati, 2013. "Financial Regulation in an Agent Based Macroeconomic Model," MPRA Paper 51013, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Ignacio Lozano & Alexander Guarín, 2014. "Banking Fragility in Colombia: An Empirical Analysis Based on Balance Sheets," BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA 011145, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA.
  5. Peia, Oana & Vranceanu , Radu, 2014. "Optimal Return in a Model of Bank Small-business Financing," ESSEC Working Papers WP1403, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:13/30. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jim Beardow) or (Hassan Zaidi).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.