Wholesale Bank Funding, Capital Requirements and Credit Rationing
AbstractThis paper analyzes how different types of bank funding affect the extent to which banks ration credit to borrowers, and the impact that capital requirements have on that rationing. Using an extension of the standard Stiglitz-Weiss model of credit rationing, unsecured wholesale finance is shown to amplify the credit market impact of capital requirements as compared to funding by retail depositors. Unsecured finance surged in the pre-crisis years, but is increasingly replaced by secured funding. The collateralization of wholesale funding is found to expand the extent of credit rationing.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 13/30.
Date of creation: 31 Jan 2013
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Other versions of this item:
- Agur, Itai, 2013. "Wholesale bank funding, capital requirements and credit rationing," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 38-45.
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-02-16 (All new papers)
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