Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Fiscal Performance, Institutional Design and Decentralization in European Union Countries

Contents:

Author Info

  • Luc Eyraud
  • Anita Tuladhar
  • Julio Escolano
  • Marialuz Moreno Badia
  • Juliane Sarnes

Abstract

This paper analyzes the impact of decentralization on overall fiscal performance in the European Union, taking into account fiscal institutional arrangements. We find that spending decentralization has been associated with sizably better fiscal performance, especially when transfer dependency of subnational governments is low. However, subnational fiscal rules do not seem to be associated with better performance.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=25719
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 12/45.

as in new window
Length: 32
Date of creation: 01 Feb 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:12/45

Contact details of provider:
Postal: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA
Phone: (202) 623-7000
Fax: (202) 623-4661
Email:
Web page: http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/pubs/ord_info.htm

Related research

Keywords: European Union; Government expenditures; decentralization; fiscal rules; fiscal decentralization; subnational governments; fiscal performance; fiscal rule; subnational government; government spending; fiscal federalism; budget balance; fiscal institutions; fiscal discipline; fiscal policy; subnational expenditure; federalism; fiscal position; revenue autonomy; fiscal deficits; subnational levels; fiscal balances; sub-national government; budget constraint; expenditure decentralization; public finance; subnational authorities; budget constraints; government revenue; fiscal data; fiscal relations; government expenditure; budgetary discipline; taxation; sub-national governments; fiscal behavior; public debt; tax autonomy; fiscal policies; subnational government expenditure; fiscal indiscipline; decentralization variables; fiscal risks; decentralizations; intergovernmental transfers; fiscal reaction; medium-term budgetary frameworks; tax effort; central government spending; subnational budget; fiscal statistics; local expenditure; fiscal targets; fiscal reaction function; government decentralization; fiscal outcomes; budget law; tax decentralization; local expenditures; medium-term fiscal frameworks; intergovernmental fiscal relations; fiscal frameworks; public finances; local budgets; discretionary fiscal policy; tax burden; tax revenues; fiscal consolidation; subnational deficits; intergovernmental fiscal; fiscal positions; revenue collection; fiscal sustainability; subnational debt; fiscal prudence; economic case for decentralization; national fiscal rules; fiscal constitution; decentralization indicators; fiscal studies; expenditure cuts; expenditure growth; local revenues; tax collection; tax rates; fiscal balance; decentralization programs; budget balances; general government expenditure; fiscal consolidations; tax collection capacity; central government fiscal; central fiscal; primary expenditure; fiscal governance;

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. J├╝rgen Von Hagen & Massimo Bordignon & Bhajan S. Grewal & Per Peterson & Helmut Seitz & Matz Dahlberg, 2000. "Subnational Government Bailouts in OECD Countries: Four Case Studies," Research Department Publications 3100, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  2. Beck, T.H.L. & Clarke, G. & Groff, A. & Keefer , P. & Walsh, P., 2001. "New tools in comparative political economy: The database of political institutions," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3125517, Tilburg University.
  3. Charles E. McLure, Jr. & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 1998. "Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Vietnam," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper9802, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
  4. Xavier Debrun & Laurent Moulin & Alessandro Turrini & Joaquim Ayuso-i-Casals & Manmohan S. Kumar, 2008. "Tied to the mast? National fiscal rules in the European Union," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 23, pages 297-362, 04.
  5. Douglas Sutherland & Robert W.R. Price & Isabelle Joumard, 2005. "Fiscal Rules for Sub-central Governments: Design and Impact," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 465, OECD Publishing.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Luc Eyraud & Marialuz Moreno Badia, 2013. "Too Small to Fail? Subnational Spending Pressures in Europe," IMF Working Papers 13/46, International Monetary Fund.
  2. Gu, Gyun Cheol, 2012. "Developing Composite Indicators for Fiscal Decentralization: Which Is The Best Measure For Whom?," MPRA Paper 43032, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Sacchi, Agnese & Salotti, Simone, 2014. "The asymmetric nature of fiscal decentralization: theory and practice," MPRA Paper 54506, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Furceri, Davide & Sacchi, Agnese & Salotti, Simone, 2014. "Can fiscal decentralization alleviate government consumption volatility?," MPRA Paper 54513, University Library of Munich, Germany.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:12/45. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jim Beardow) or (Hassan Zaidi).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.