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Consolidated Regulation and Supervision in the United States

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  • Ashok Vir Bhatia
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    Abstract

    This paper builds on a Technical Note produced as part of the IMF’s 2010 Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) review of the United States. It addresses enterprise-wide oversight of financial groups, a key tool to mitigate systemic risk. Focusing on legal arrangements, it recommends eliminating exceptions for holding companies owning certain limited-purpose banks, harmonizing arrangements for bank and thrift holding companies, and bringing into the net a few systemic nonbank financial groups, with the Federal Reserve as the sole consolidated regulator and supervisor.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 11/23.

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    Length: 25
    Date of creation: 01 Jan 2011
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:11/23

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    Related research

    Keywords: Bank supervision; Banking sector; Financial systems; Nonbank financial sector; holding company; banking; financial sector; financial stability; deposit insurance; bank holding; consolidated supervision; financial system; hedge; bank holding company; investment banking; financial intermediaries; derivative; financial institutions; hedge funds; investment bank; financial safety net; banking system; federal deposit insurance; derivative product; bank holding companies; financial conglomerates; financial market; money market; commodity futures; hedge fund; credit union; futures trading; financial regulation; settlement system; national bank; capital adequacy; bank regulation; money market funds; credit derivatives; financial regulations; hedging; bank system; bank subsidiaries; financial statements; financial contracts; bank supervisor; bank charters; moral hazard; insured deposit; money market mutual funds; bank board; bank deposits;

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    Cited by:
    1. repec:fip:fedcwp:13-12 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Mark Flood & Jonathan Katz & Stephen J Ong & Adam Smith, 2013. "Cryptography and the economics of supervisory information: balancing transparency and confidentiality," Working Paper 1312, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    3. Edgardo Demaestri & Gustavo Ferro, 2013. "Analysis of the Integration of Financial Regulation and Supervision to the Central Bank," Ensayos Económicos, Central Bank of Argentina, Economic Research Department, vol. 1(68), pages 75-106, June.

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