Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Communication of Central Bank Thinking and Inflation Dynamics

Contents:

Author Info

  • Man-Keung Tang
  • Xiangrong Yu

Abstract

This paper studies the role of central bank communication of its economic assessment in shaping inflation dynamics. Imperfect information about the central bank''s assessment - or the basis for monetary policy decisions - could complicate the private sector''s learning about its policy response function. We show how clear central bank communication, which facilitates agents'' understanding of policy reasoning, could bring about less volatile inflation and interest rate dynamics, and afford the authorities with greater policy flexibility. We then estimate a simple monetary model to fit the Mexican economy, and use the suggested paramters to illustrate the model''s quantitative implications in scenarios where the timing, nature and persistence of shocks are uncertain.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=25199
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 11/209.

as in new window
Length: 32
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:11/209

Contact details of provider:
Postal: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA
Phone: (202) 623-7000
Fax: (202) 623-4661
Email:
Web page: http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/pubs/ord_info.htm

Related research

Keywords: Monetary policy; Central bank role; Economic models; Inflation targeting; inflation; central bank; monetary economics; inflation dynamics; monetary model; rational expectations; monetary fund; monetary policy decisions; optimal monetary policy; monetary policy rules; money supply; inflationary pressure; inflation deviation; price stability; inflation target; monetary policy rule; increase in inflation; inflation forecasts; monetary aggregate; rise in inflation; monetary policy regime; high inflation; financial stability; real interest rate; lower inflation; monetary system; price level; change in inflation; monetary framework; inflation objective; inflation-targeting; inflation targeting framework; steady-state inflation; nominal interest rate; monetary targeting; increase in interest rates; monetary reaction function; inflation rate; reduction in inflation; monetary regimes; monetary policy transparency; monetary stance;

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Milani, Fabio, 2007. "Expectations, learning and macroeconomic persistence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(7), pages 2065-2082, October.
  2. Brock, William A. & Durlauf, Steven N. & West, Kenneth D., 2007. "Model uncertainty and policy evaluation: Some theory and empirics," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 136(2), pages 629-664, February.
  3. Faust, J. & Svensson, L.E.O., 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," Papers 636, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  4. Michael Woodford, 1999. "Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia," NBER Working Papers 7261, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Benigno, Pierpaolo & Lopez-Salido, J. David, 2006. "Inflation Persistence and Optimal Monetary Policy in the Euro Area," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(3), pages 587-614, April.
  6. Mankiw, N. Gregory & Reis, Ricardo & Wolfers, Justin, 2003. "Disagreement about Inflation Expectations," Research Papers 1807, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  7. Brock, W.A., 1995. "A Rational Route to Randomness," Working papers 9530, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  8. Clarida, Richard & Galí, Jordi & Gertler, Mark, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 2139, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Lars E. O. Svensson, 1996. "Inflation Forecast Targeting: Implementing and Monitoring Inflation Targets," NBER Working Papers 5797, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Stefano Eusepi & Bruce Preston, 2007. "Central Bank Communication and Expectations Stabilization," Discussion Papers 0708-10, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  11. Andrew G. Haldane & Nicoletta Batini, 1998. "Forward-Looking Rules for Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 6543, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. International Monetary Fund, 2009. "Inflation Targeting Under Imperfect Policy Credibility," IMF Working Papers 09/94, International Monetary Fund.
  13. Fabián Gredig U. & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel D. & Rodrigo O. Valdés P., 2008. "The Monetary Policy Horizon in Chile and Other Inflation-Targeting Countries," Journal Economía Chilena (The Chilean Economy), Central Bank of Chile, vol. 11(1), pages 5-27, April.
  14. Brock, W.A. & Hommes, C.H., 1996. "Hetergeneous Beliefs and Routes to Chaos in a Simple Asset Pricing Model," Working papers 9621, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  15. Andersson, Magnus & Hofmann, Boris, 2009. "Gauging the effectiveness of quantitative forward guidance: evidence from three inflation targeters," Working Paper Series 1098, European Central Bank.
  16. Daniel Chiquiar & Antonio Noriega & Manuel Ramos-Francia, 2010. "A time-series approach to test a change in inflation persistence: the Mexican experience," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(24), pages 3067-3075.
  17. Collard, Fabrice & Dellas, Harris, 2004. "The New Keynesian Model with Imperfect Information and Learning," IDEI Working Papers 273, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  18. Orphanides, Athanasios & Williams, John C., 2007. "Robust monetary policy with imperfect knowledge," Working Paper Series 0764, European Central Bank.
  19. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 13932, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Athanasios Orphanides & John C. Williams, 2003. "Robust monetary policy rules with unknown natural rates," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2003-11, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  21. Michael Woodford, 2005. "Central-bank communication and policy effectiveness," Discussion Papers 0506-07, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  22. Erceg, Christopher J. & Levin, Andrew T., 2003. "Imperfect credibility and inflation persistence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 915-944, May.
  23. Carlos Capistrán & Manuel Ramos-Francia, 2010. "Does Inflation Targeting Affect the Dispersion of Inflation Expectations?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(1), pages 113-134, 02.
  24. Frederic S Mishkin, 2004. "Can Central Bank Transparency Go Too Far?," RBA Annual Conference Volume, in: Christopher Kent & Simon Guttmann (ed.), The Future of Inflation Targeting Reserve Bank of Australia.
  25. Makoto Minegishi & Boris Cournède, 2009. "The Role of Transparency in the Conduct of Monetary Policy," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 724, OECD Publishing.
  26. Vitor Gaspar & Frank Smets & David Vestin, 2006. "Adaptive Learning, Persistence, and Optimal Monetary Policy," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 4(2-3), pages 376-385, 04-05.
  27. Michele Berardi, 2009. "Monetary Policy with Heterogeneous and Misspecified Expectations," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(1), pages 79-100, 02.
  28. Sims, Christopher A, 2002. "Solving Linear Rational Expectations Models," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 20(1-2), pages 1-20, October.
  29. Fujiwara, Ippei, 2005. "Is the central bank's publication of economic forecasts influential?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 89(3), pages 255-261, December.
  30. Ben S. Bernanke & Frederic S. Mishkin, 1997. "Inflation Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary Policy?," NBER Working Papers 5893, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  31. Chanont Banternghansa & Michael W. McCracken, 2009. "Forecast disagreement among FOMC members," Working Papers 2009-059, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  32. Luis F. Céspedes & Marcelo Ochoa & Claudio Soto, 2005. "The New Keynesian Phillips Curve in an Emerging Market Economy: The Case of Chile," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 355, Central Bank of Chile.
  33. Bank for International Settlements, 2009. "Communication of monetary policy decisions by central banks: what is revealed and why," BIS Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 47, July.
  34. Branch, William A. & Evans, George W., 2010. "Monetary Policy and Heterogeneous Expectations," SIRE Discussion Papers 2010-32, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  35. Carvalho, Alexandre & Moura, Marcelo L., 2008. "What Can Taylor Rules Say About Monetary Policy in Latin America?," Insper Working Papers wpe_126, Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa.
  36. M. Hashem Pesaran & Martin Weale, 2005. "Survey Expectations," CESifo Working Paper Series 1599, CESifo Group Munich.
  37. Calvo, Guillermo A., 1983. "Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 383-398, September.
  38. Scott Roger & Mark R. Stone, 2005. "On Target? the International Experience with Achieving Inflation Targets," IMF Working Papers 05/163, International Monetary Fund.
  39. Yang K. Lu & Ernesto Pasten & Robert G. King, 2008. "Managing expectations," 2008 Meeting Papers 959, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  40. Richard Clarida & Jordi Gali & Mark Gertler, 1997. "Monetary Policy Rules in Practice: Some International Evidence," NBER Working Papers 6254, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  41. Carlos Capistrán & Allan Timmermann, 2009. "Disagreement and Biases in Inflation Expectations," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(2-3), pages 365-396, 03.
  42. N. Nergiz Dincer & Barry Eichengreen, 2007. "Central Bank Transparency: Where, Why, and with What Effects?," NBER Working Papers 13003, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  43. Simon Hall & Chris Salmon & Tony Yates & Nicoletta Batini, 1999. "Uncertainty and Simple Monetary Policy Rules - An illustration for the United Kingdom," Bank of England working papers 96, Bank of England.
  44. Ben S. Bernanke & Michael Woodford, 1997. "Inflation forecasts and monetary policy," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 653-686.
  45. Takeshi Kimura & Kosuke Aoki, 2009. "Central Bank's Two-Way Communication with the Public and Inflation Dynamics," 2009 Meeting Papers 108, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  46. Gagnon, Edith & Khan, Hashmat, 2005. "New Phillips curve under alternative production technologies for Canada, the United States, and the Euro area," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 1571-1602, August.
  47. Benati, Luca, 2008. "Investigating inflation persistence across monetary regimes," Working Paper Series 0851, European Central Bank.
  48. Morten O. Ravn & Harald Uhlig, 2002. "On adjusting the Hodrick-Prescott filter for the frequency of observations," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(2), pages 371-375.
  49. Roberts, John M, 1995. "New Keynesian Economics and the Phillips Curve," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(4), pages 975-84, November.
  50. Ehrmann, Michael & Fratzscher, Marcel, 2007. "Explaining monetary policy in press conferences," Working Paper Series 0767, European Central Bank.
  51. Ricardo Nunes, 2005. "Learning the inflation target," Macroeconomics 0504033, EconWPA, revised 26 Apr 2005.
  52. M. H. Khalil Timamy, 2005. "Debate," Review of African Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(104-105), pages 383-393, June.
  53. Rozkrut, Marek & Rybinski, Krzysztof & Sztaba, Lucyna & Szwaja, Radoslaw, 2007. "Quest for central bank communication: Does it pay to be "talkative"?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 176-206, March.
  54. Woodford, Michael, 1999. "Optimal monetary policy inertia," CFS Working Paper Series 1999/09, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
  55. Nergiz Dincer & Barry Eichengreen, 2009. "Central Bank Transparency: Causes, Consequences and Updates," NBER Working Papers 14791, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  56. Branch, William A. & McGough, Bruce, 2009. "A New Keynesian model with heterogeneous expectations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 1036-1051, May.
  57. Andersson, Malin & Dillen, Hans & Sellin, Peter, 2006. "Monetary policy signaling and movements in the term structure of interest rates," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(8), pages 1815-1855, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:11/209. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jim Beardow) or (Hassan Zaidi).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.