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Policy Coordination in Fiscal Federalism

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  • Serhan Cevik

Abstract

Using the cyclically adjusted non-hydrocarbon primary balance, this paper investigates the evolution of the fiscal policy stance in the United Arab Emirates at consolidated and sub-national levels in the run-up and after the crisis. The empirical findings show that procyclical fiscal policies prior to the crisis reinforced the financial sector cycle, exacerbated the economic upswing, and thereby contributed to the build-up of macro-financial vulnerabilities. The paper also sets out policy lessons to develop a rule-based fiscal framework that would help strengthen fiscal policy coordination between the various layers of government and ensure long-term fiscal sustainability and a more equitable intergenerational distribution of wealth.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 11/147.

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Length: 23
Date of creation: 01 Jun 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:11/147

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Keywords: Debt sustainability; Fiscal sustainability; Hydrocarbons; Taxation; Natural resources; Public debt; fiscal policy; fiscal stance; primary deficit; budget balance; fiscal decentralization; fiscal federalism; fiscal rules; fiscal policies; fiscal risks; fiscal deficit; primary budget deficit; fiscal consolidation; fiscal balance; budget deficit; primary budget balance; fiscal performance; fiscal sustainability analysis; fiscal impulse; fiscal framework; fiscal position; debt service; government spending; fiscal adjustment; fiscal space; expansionary fiscal; medium-term fiscal framework; long-term fiscal sustainability; government expenditure; government expenditures; data limitations; fiscal rule; fiscal operations; fiscal deficits; fiscal activities; budget constraints; aggregate demand; tax revenues; public finances; fiscal solvency; fiscal discipline; fiscal imbalances; quasi-fiscal activities; national budget; fiscal policy objectives; fiscal balances; structural budget balance; fiscal aggregates; political economy of fiscal federalism; fiscal base; fiscal authorities; fiscal reporting; fiscal risk; fiscal vulnerability; interest expenditure; fiscal support; local expenditures; financial system; fiscal transfer mechanism; fiscal transfer; fiscal policy formulation; public expenditure; fiscal situation; fiscal multipliers; fiscal costs; intergovernmental fiscal relations; intergovernmental fiscal; fiscal capacity; fiscal indiscipline; budgetary institutions; federal fiscal systems; fiscal policy coordination; national fiscal rules; annual budget; fiscal systems; public finance; expenditure growth; expansionary fiscal policies; capital expenditures; fiscal policy management; data availability; fiscal transparency; fiscal assumptions; government budget; fiscal burden; fiscal accounts;

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References

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  1. Andr�s Rodr�guez-Pose & Adala Bwire, 2004. "The economic (in)efficiency of devolution," Environment and Planning A, Pion Ltd, London, vol. 36(11), pages 1907-1928, November.
  2. International Monetary Fund, 2011. "How Strong Are Fiscal Multipliers in the GCC? An Empirical Investigation," IMF Working Papers 11/61, International Monetary Fund.
  3. David E. Wildasin, 2001. "Externalities and Bailouts: Hard and Soft Budget Constraints in Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations," Public Economics 0112002, EconWPA.
  4. Teresa Ter-Minassian, 2006. "Fiscal Rules for Subnational Governments: Can They Promote Fiscal Discipline?," OECD Journal on Budgeting, OECD Publishing, vol. 6(3), pages 1-11.
  5. Tanzi, Vito, 2008. "The future of fiscal federalism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 705-712, September.
  6. Crivelli, Ernesto & Staal, Klaas, 2006. "Size and soft budget constraints," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 172, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  7. Thushyanthan Baskaran & Lars P. Feld, 2009. "Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth in OECD Countries: Is there a Relationship?," CESifo Working Paper Series 2721, CESifo Group Munich.
  8. Eduardo Lora, 2007. "The State of State Reform in Latin America," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 6642, October.
  9. International Monetary Fund, 2010. "The Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy in the Middle East and Central Asia:Is the Current Crisis Different?," IMF Working Papers 10/68, International Monetary Fund.
  10. Tanzi, Vito, 2008. "The future of fiscal federalism," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2008-03, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  11. Morten O. Ravn & Harald Uhlig, 2002. "On adjusting the Hodrick-Prescott filter for the frequency of observations," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(2), pages 371-375.
  12. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416.
  13. Gary Woller & Kerk Phillips, 1998. "Fiscal decentralisation and IDC economic growth: An empirical investigation," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 34(4), pages 139-148.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Carlos Caceres & Serhan Cevik & Ricardo Fenochietto & Borja Gracia, 2013. "The Day After Tomorrow," IMF Working Papers 13/79, International Monetary Fund.
  2. Ilham Haouas & Raimundo Soto, 2012. "Has the UAE Escaped the Oil Curse?," Documentos de Trabajo 412, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
  3. Syed Abul, Basher, 2013. "Regional Initiative in the Gulf Arab States: The Search for a Common Currency," MPRA Paper 46486, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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