Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Monetary Policy Committees, Learning, and Communication

Contents:

Author Info

  • Anke Weber

Abstract

This paper considers optimal communication by monetary policy committees in a model of imperfect knowledge and learning. The main policy implications are that there may be costs to central bank communication if the public is perpetually learning about the committee''s decision-making process and policy preferences. When committee members have heterogeneous policy preferences, welfare is greater under majority voting than under consensus decision-making. Furthermore, central bank communication under majority voting is more likely to be beneficial in this case. It is also shown that a chairman with stable policy preferences who carries significant weight in the monetary policy decision-making process is welfare enhancing.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=23768
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 10/85.

as in new window
Length: 41
Date of creation: 01 Apr 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:10/85

Contact details of provider:
Postal: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA
Phone: (202) 623-7000
Fax: (202) 623-4661
Email:
Web page: http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/pubs/ord_info.htm

Related research

Keywords: Announcements; Economic models; inflation; monetary policy; central bank; inflation stabilization; inflation rate; monetary fund; rational expectations; inflation targeting; optimal monetary policy; inflation dynamics; expectations of inflation; monetary policy framework; monetary policy decision; monetary uncertainty;

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Esteban Colla De Robertis & Last: Colla De Robertis, 2010. "Monetary policy committees and the decision to publish voting records," Documentos de Investigación - Research Papers 1, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, CEMLA.
  2. Timo Henckel & Shaun Vahey & Liz Wakerly, 2011. "Probabilistic Interest Rate Setting With A Shadow Board: A Description Of The Pilot Project," CAMA Working Papers 2011-27, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:10/85. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jim Beardow) or (Hassan Zaidi).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.