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Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Low-Income Countries

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Author Info

  • Sophia Gollwitzer
  • Eteri Kvintradze
  • Tej Prakash
  • Luis-Felipe Zanna
  • Era Dabla-Norris
  • Richard Allen
  • Irene Yackovlev
  • Victor Duarte Lledo
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    This paper presents, for the first time, multi-dimensional indices of the quality of budget institutions in low-income countries. The indices allow for benchmarking against the performance of middle-income countries, across regions, and according to different institutional arrangements that deliver good fiscal performance. Using the constructed indices, the paper provides preliminary empirical support for the hypotheses that strong budget institutions help improve fiscal balances and public external debt outcomes; and countries with stronger fiscal institutions have better scope to conduct countercyclical policies.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 10/80.

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    Length: 56
    Date of creation: 01 Mar 2010
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:10/80

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    Related research

    Keywords: Budget deficits; Budgetary policy; Budgets; Economic models; Low-income developing countries; budget institutions; budget process; fiscal discipline; fiscal performance; fiscal policy; fiscal transparency; budget planning; fiscal rules; fiscal outcomes; annual budget; budget approval; central government spending; budgetary institutions; central government expenditures; fiscal policies; budgetary process; external audit; fiscal institutions; budget documents; government expenditures; public finances; capital expenditures; government spending; budget implementation; fiscal consolidation; budget practices; fiscal positions; budget systems; accounting standards; government expenditure; fiscal risks; fiscal targets; aggregate fiscal; financial management; public debt; fiscal balance; expenditure levels; fiscal forecasting; internal audit; fiscal forecasts; fiscal aggregates; budget authority; budgetary expenditure; budget preparation; budget rules; budget outcomes; fiscal sustainability; budget framework; fiscal position; public financial management; dual budgeting; central budget; public expenditure; extrabudgetary funds; budget law; public finance; primary fiscal balance; budget constraint; tax revenues; budgetary rules; fiscal stance; budgetary allocations; capital investment; budget documentation; actual expenditure; budget transparency; fiscal projections; fiscal balances; budget management; budget decisions; fiscal activities; fiscal framework; government revenue; aggregate fiscal discipline; budget cycle; fiscal affairs; fiscal behavior; budget submissions; budgetary consequences; national fiscal rules; fiscal profligacy; accountability mechanisms; tax base; budget envelope; tax bases; treasury systems; budgeted expenditure; budget year; fiscal reports; fiscal information; fiscal response; performance budgeting; fiscal policy responses; pfm systems; government guarantees; fiscal risk; budget proposal; central government expenditure; fiscal affairs departments; accrual accounting; fiscal authorities; budgetary processes; budgetary authority; fiscal objectives; fiscal economists; budgetary practices; budgetary decision; fiscal decision; fiscal variables; fiscal management; fiscal prudence; public budget; transparent budgets; accrual budgeting; public spending; fiscal deficits; budget formulation process; contingent liabilities; fiscal deficit; fiscal reforms; budgetary policies; fiscal affairs department; fiscal strategy; fragmented fiscal policy; credible budget; budgetary decision-making; fiscal controls; budget information; national budget; fiscal stability; budget execution; open budget preparation; allocating public resources; budgetary resources; budget document; budget outturns; annual budget process; fiscal surpluses; medium-term budgetary frameworks; budget policy; international accounting standards; expenditure growth; budget deficit; budget formulation;

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    References

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    Citations

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    Cited by:
    1. Victor Duarte Lledo & Marcos Poplawski-Ribeiro, 2011. "Fiscal Policy Implementation in Sub-Saharan Africa," IMF Working Papers 11/172, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Jakob Haan & Richard Jong-A-Pin & Jochen Mierau, 2013. "Do budgetary institutions mitigate the common pool problem? New empirical evidence for the EU," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 423-441, September.
    3. Rene Tapsoba, 2012. "Do National Numerical Fiscal Rules Really Shape Fiscal Behaviours in Developing Countries? A Treatment Effect Evaluation," Working Papers halshs-00667201, HAL.
    4. Grigoli, Francesco & Mills, Zachary, 2011. "Do high and volatile levels of public investment suggest misconduct ? the role of institutional quality," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5735, The World Bank.
    5. Nkunde Mwase, 2011. "Determinants of Development Financing Flows From Brazil, Russia, India, and China to Low-Income Countries," IMF Working Papers 11/255, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Jakob Haan & Jeroen Klomp, 2013. "Conditional political budget cycles: a review of recent evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(3), pages 387-410, December.
    7. Benedicte Vibe Christensen, 2010. "China in Africa: A Macroeconomic Perspective," Working Papers id:3169, eSocialSciences.

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