Should Advanced Countries Adopt a Fiscal Responsibility Law?
AbstractFiscal Responsibility Laws (FRLs) appear to be more popular in middle-income countries than advanced countries, even though their success is limited. The reasons why few advanced countries have a FRL include: the existing legal framework for the budget system is adequate; supranational rules and political agreements in EU countries; failed attempts to include quantitative fiscal rules in laws; lack of consensus or interest in attaining the goals of FRL-type legislation; and lack of need for a law to regulate fiscal transparency, accountability and macro-fiscal stabilization. Without commitment to fiscal discipline, adoption of a FRL may not contribute to attaining fiscal consolidation goals.
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Date of creation: 01 Nov 2010
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-12-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2010-12-04 (Central Banking)
- NEP-PBE-2010-12-04 (Public Economics)
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