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Hold Your Nose and Vote

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  • Marco Pani
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    Abstract

    This paper analyses why corruption can persist for long periods in a democracy and inquires whether this can result from a well-informed rational choice of the citizens. By applying a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy, the paper analyzes how corruption distortsthe allocation of resources between public and private expenditure, altering the policy preferences of elected and nonelected citizens in opposite directions. The result is a reduction in real public expenditure and, if the median voter''s demand for public goods is sufficiently elastic, a tax reduction. In this case, some citizens can indirectly benefit from corruption. The paper shows that, under this condition, if the citizens anticipate a shift in policy preferences in favor of higher public expenditure, they may support institutional arrangements that favor corruption (such as a weak enforcement of the law) in order to alter future policy decisions in their favor. This result complements the findings of other studies that have attributed the persistence of corruption in a democracyto some failure on the part of the voters or the electoral system. It also bears implications for developing effective anticorruption strategies and for redefining the role that can be played by the international community.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 09/83.

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    Length: 32
    Date of creation: 01 Apr 2009
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:09/83

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    Keywords: Corruption; Developed countries; Developing countries; Governance; Government expenditures; Economic models; voter; law; law enforcement; voters; election; voting; elections; electoral system; electoral systems; political science; voting behavior; political parties; proportional representation; congressional elections;

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    References

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    1. Galeotti, Gianluigi & Merlo, Antonio, 1994. "Political Collusion and Corruption in a Representative Democracy," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , , vol. 49(Supplemen), pages 232-43.
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    18. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(2), pages 265-86, April.
    19. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    23. Sanjeev Gupta & Hamid Davoodi & Rosa Alonso-Terme, 2002. "Does corruption affect income inequality and poverty?," Economics of Governance, Springer, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 23-45, 03.
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    Cited by:
    1. Arvind K. Jain, 2011. "Corruption: Theory, Evidence and Policy," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 9(2), pages 3-9, 07.

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