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Revenue Mobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa

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  • Mario Mansour
  • Michael Keen

Abstract

This paper evaluates the nature and extent of, and possible responses to, two of the central challenges that globalization poses for revenue mobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA): from corporate tax competition, and from trade liberalization. It does so using a new dataset with features needed to meaningfully address these issues: a distinction between resourcerelated and other revenues, and a disentangling of tariff from commodity tax revenue. Countries'' experiences vary quite widely, nonresource revenues have been essentially stagnant. Corporate tax revenues have held up, despite a reduction in rates and evidence of substantial base-narrowing-something of a puzzle-and trade tax revenue reductions have been largely offset by other measures. Options for dealing with the continuation and intensification of the challenges, which the present crisis is likely to accelerate-including through regional cooperation-are discussed.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 09/157.

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Length: 47
Date of creation: 01 Jul 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:09/157

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Related research

Keywords: Corporate taxes; Revenue mobilization; Tax incentives; Tax reforms; Tax revenues; Trade policy; tax revenue; taxation; tax competition; indirect taxes; tax reform; tax rates; tax base; tax ratios; tax system; tax policy; tax ratio; trade taxes; indirect tax; tax design; tax administration; total tax revenue; corporate tax rate; tax treatment; tax administrations; international tax; consumption tax; income taxes; personal income tax; fiscal documentation; tax liability; corporate income tax; effective tax rates; tariff rates; tax planning; tax systems; corporation tax; export taxes; tax credits; tax return; public finance; tariff rate; tariff structure; payroll taxes; tax expenditure; tax advantages; sales taxes; trade taxation; domestic tax; average tax ratio; tax increases; domestic indirect taxes; formal sector; fiscal policy; international tax competition; tax bases; income tax revenues; foreign tax credit; tax income; tax effort; corporate tax rates; investment tax credits; domestic tax reform; tax credit; tax authorities; tax benefits; tariff reduction; tax revenue/gdp; tax receipts; stamp duties; foreign tax; taxation base; tax countries; corporate tax base; indirect taxation; fiscal priorities; tax purposes; tax journal; national tax journal; tax analysis; taxable profits; taxable income; reforms of tax administration; tax coordination; fiscal affairs department; government revenue; excise tax; taxes on business; low-tax countries; fiscal affairs; tax burden; tax measures; labor taxes; present value of taxes; taxes on income; fiscal restraints; fiscal implications; personal income tax rate; country taxation; rate of tax; tax rate structure; consumption taxes; taxes on capital; large taxpayer units; tax sparing; border taxes; direct tax; domestic taxes; tax area; optimal tax; tax revenue ratio; interest payments; excise taxes; petroleum taxation; tax categories; marginal tax rates; direct taxes; taxpayer units; central fiscal; external tariffs; business taxation; tax havens;

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References

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  13. Luci Ellis & Kathryn Smith, 2010. "The Global Upward Trend in the Profit Share," Applied Economics Quarterly (formerly: Konjunkturpolitik), Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, vol. 56(3), pages 231-256.
  14. Haque, M. Emranul & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2005. "On the revenue implications of trade liberalization under imperfect competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 27-31, July.
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