The paper shows how tax rate cuts can increase revenues by improving tax compliance. The intuition is that tax evasion has externalities: tax evaders protect each other, because they tie down limited enforcement capacity. Thus, relatively small tax rate cuts, which decrease incentives to evade taxes, can lead to increased revenues through spillovers - creating Laffer effects. Interestingly, tax rate cuts here imply increasing effective taxes. The model is consistent with what happened in Russia, and may provide basis for further thinking about tax rate cuts in other countries.
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Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number
08/7.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Marco Bassetto & Christopher Phelan, 2006.
"Tax riots,"
Working Paper Series
WP-06-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998.
"Tax Compliance,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 818-860, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002.
"Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration,"
Handbook of Public Economics,
in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470
Elsevier.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: