Using a new fiscal dataset for small states, this paper analyzes the link between country size, government size, debt, and economic performance. It finds that on average small states have larger governments and higher public debt. Although there are intrinsic factors that explain why governments are bigger in small states, those with smaller governments and lower public debt tend to grow faster and are less vulnerable. Large fiscal adjustments, primarily through expenditure restraint, can underpin growth, although sometimes other elements can also impact. Since better governance is associated with lower debt, fiscal adjustment should be supported by governance improvements.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number
08/39.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Douglas W. Elmendorf & N. Gregory Mankiw, 1998.
"Government Debt,"
NBER Working Papers
6470, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Elmendorf, Douglas W. & Gregory Mankiw, N., 1999.
"Government debt,"
Handbook of Macroeconomics,
in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 25, pages 1615-1669
Elsevier.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Alesina, Alberto & Spolaore, Enrico & Wacziarg, Romain, 2005.
"Trade, Growth and the Size of Countries,"
Handbook of Economic Growth,
in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 23, pages 1499-1542
Elsevier.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: