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Germany's Corporate Governance Reforms

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  • Jürgen Odenius
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    Abstract

    This article reviews Germany''s corporate governance system and the effectiveness of recent reforms. Since the early 1990s far-reaching reforms have complemented the traditional stakeholder system with important elements of the shareholder system. Instead of taking a view on the superiority of either system, this article raises the important question whether these reforms created sufficient flexibility for the market to optimize its corporate governance structure within well established social and legal norms. It concludes that there is scope for enhancing flexibility in three core areas, relating to (i) internal control mechanisms, especially the flexibility of board structures; (ii) self-dealing; and (iii) external control, particularly take-over activity.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 08/179.

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    Length: 19
    Date of creation: 01 Jul 2008
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:08/179

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    Related research

    Keywords: Economic reforms; Securities regulations; corporate governance; shareholders; shareholder; minority shareholders; corporate governance system; corporate governance reforms; stakeholder; large shareholders; corporate law; takeover law; corporate governance systems; governance system; corporate governance structures; corporate governance reform; controlling shareholder; corporate governance structure; ownership concentration; corporation; shareholder approval; shareholder value; governance systems; corporate governance framework; takeover bids; shareholder rights; conflict of interest; ownership structures; corporate scandals; shareholder protections; stakeholders; corporate governance code; conflicts of interest; protecting minority shareholders; shareholder wealth; poison pills; hostile takeovers; corporate managers; corporations; protection of minority shareholders; hostile takeover; insider trading; single shareholder; majority vote; asset sales; aktiengesellschaft; international corporate governance; principal-agent; separation of ownership; foreign company; boards of directors; company law; industrial companies; takeover attempts; public limited company; business law; large companies; parent companies; private company; limited company; comparative corporate law; trade union; corporate governance frameworks; investor protection; holding company; trade unions; mandatory disclosure; federal securities; private companies; takeover attempt; principal-agent problem; corporate finance;

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    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Tirole, Jean, 1999. "Corporate Governance," CEPR Discussion Papers 2086, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Simeon Djankov & Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2005. "The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing," NBER Working Papers 11883, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti & Robert Marquez, 2009. "Stakeholder Capitalism, Corporate Governance and Firm Value," Economics Working Papers ECO2009/10, European University Institute.
    4. Goergen, Marc & Manjon, Miguel C. & Renneboog, Luc, 2008. "Recent developments in German corporate governance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 175-193, September.
    5. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1980. "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 42-64, Spring.
    6. Conac Pierre-Henri & Enriques Luca & Gelter Martin, 2007. "Constraining Dominant Shareholders' Self-Dealing: The Legal Framework in France, Germany, and Italy," European Company and Financial Law Review, De Gruyter, vol. 4(4), pages 491-528, December.
    7. Denis, Diane K. & McConnell, John J., 2003. "International Corporate Governance," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(01), pages 1-36, March.
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