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Strategic Interactions between an Independent Central Bank and a Myopic Government with Government Debt

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Author Info
Sven Jari Stehn
David Vines

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Abstract

We analyse optimal discretionary games between a benevolent central bank and a myopic government in a New Keynesian model. First, when lump-sum taxes are available and public debt is absent, we show that a Nash game results in too much government spending and excessively high interest rates, while fiscal leadership reinstates the cooperative outcome under discretion. Second, we show that this familiar result breaks down when lump-sum taxes are unavailable. With government debt, the Nash equilibrium still entails too much public spending but leads to lower interest rates than the cooperative policy, because debt has to be adjusted back to its pre-shock level to ensure time consistency. A setup of fiscal leadership does not avoid this socially costly outcome. Imposing a debt penalty onto the myopic government under either Nash or fiscal leadership raises welfare substantially, while appointing a conservative central bank is less effective.

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Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 08/164.

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Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 21 Jul 2008
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Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:08/164

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Keywords: Central banks ; Monetary authorities ; Intergovernmental fiscal relations ; Government expenditures ; Fiscal policy ; Stabilization measures ;

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  6. Leeper, Eric M., 1991. "Equilibria under 'active' and 'passive' monetary and fiscal policies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 129-147, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Stehn, Sven Jari & Vines, David, 2008. "Debt Stabilisation Bias and the Taylor Principle: Optimal Policy in a New Keynesian Model with Government Debt and Inflation Persistence," CEPR Discussion Papers 6696, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  20. Luisa Lambertini, 2006. "Monetary-Fiscal Interactions With A Conservative Central Bank," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 53(1), pages 90-128, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  21. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521441964 is not listed on IDEAS
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Fabian Eser & Campbell Leith & Simon Wren-Lewis, 2009. "When is monetary policy all we need?," Working Papers 2009_18, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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