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Trade Restrictiveness in the CEMAC Region. the Case of Congo

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  • Maria-Angels Oliva
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    Abstract

    Congo''s vital dependence on trade for development stands in contradiction with its trade policy. As a member of the CEMAC, Congo''s tariff scheme at least formally is guided by CEMAC''s 1994 trade regime agreement. This paper shows CEMAC''s customs code is restrictive relative to that of comparable regional integration groups. The paper also discusses a number of quantitative and qualitative barriers to trade applied by Congo that render its current regime complex, nontransparent, and relatively unpredictable, compromising efforts to develop the non-oil sector and the country''s export base. Moreover, Congo''s high tariffs and other taxes have not led to higher fiscal revenues, as the number of exemptions granted in recent years has surged and customs administration remains weak.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 08/15.

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    Length: 32
    Date of creation: 01 Jan 2008
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:08/15

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    Related research

    Keywords: Trade restrictions; Revenues; Trade policy; customs; customs value; trade regime; nontariff barriers; tariff barriers; regional integration; common external tariff; external tariff; customs union; non-tariff barriers; tariff rates; regional trade; trade flows; trade policies; rules of origin; customs administration; customs unions; trade area; economic community; domestic production; tariff rate; customs duty; import duties; tariff lines; applied tariff; world trade organization; trade agreements; trade relations; excise taxes; international trade; external trade; tax concessions; world trade; free trade area; export duty; free trade; liberal rules; value of imports; tariff structures; preferential tariff; import costs; trade arrangements; trade taxation; trading partner; external tariffs; domestic consumption; import duty; regional trade arrangements; nontariff measures; trade integration; customs code; trade structure; bilateral agreements; customs duties; import value; trade taxes; trade barriers; preferential arrangements; trade reform; customs operations; discriminatory application; wage differentials; trade protection; domestic taxes; customs regime; preferential treatment; high tariffs; duty-free treatment; economic integration; tariff structure; tariff cuts; import prices; market segmentation; transaction value; quantitative restrictions; partner countries; customs procedures; customs fees; protection levels; customs tariffs; price fixing; export diversification; trade performance; customs revenue; average tariff; trading arrangements; trade liberalization; preferential agreements; terms of trade; commercial exchanges; customs processes; trading system; trade policy review; administered price; trade flow data; customs valuation system; trade openness; trade agreement; customs valuation; monetary union; custom duties; export subsidies; regional trade integration; customs revenues; social instability; merchandise trade; tariff escalation; unilateral preferences; value-added tax; trade flow; volume of trade; trading partners; liberalization of trade; free-trade area; competitive advantage; customs tariff; liberalization of trade in goods; bilateral trade agreements; reciprocal agreement; bilateral trade; competition policy; average tariff rates; trade costs;

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