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Reserve Requirements, the Maturity Structure of Debt, and Bank Runs Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Eza Al-Zein
The paper looks at the relationship between reserve requirements and the choice of the maturity structure of external debt in a general equilibrium setup, by incorporating the role of international lenders. A date- and maturity-specific reserve requirement is a fraction of the debt to be deposited in a non-interest bearing account at the central bank. At maturity, the central bank returns the reserves. There exist some specific combinations of date- and maturity-specific reserve requirements that reduce the vulnerability to bank runs. In such setup, lenders may still want to provide new short-term lending to the bank after a bank run.
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Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number
08/108.
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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 29 Apr 2008Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:08/108Contact details of provider: Postal: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA Phone: (202) 623-7000 Fax: (202) 623-4661 Email: Web page: http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: Working Paper ; Reserve requirements ; External debt ; Bank regulations ; Financial crisis ; Loans ; Central banks ; Other versions of this item:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
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