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Banking Supervision: Quality and Governance

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Author Info
Alessandro Gambini
Marco Arnone
Salim M. Darbar

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Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between the quality of banking supervision and governance of the supervisory agency, based on assessments of the Basel Core Principles and the IMF Code on Transparency in Financial Policies, covering 116 and 53 countries, respectively, with 51 common to both. We find a positive correlation between the transparency of the supervisor and the effectiveness of banking supervision; moreover, better accountability and integrity practices of the banking supervisors are associated with higher independence, which in turn is associated with better compliance with the Basel Core Principles. These results are largely robust to different stages of financial development.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 07/82.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 09 Apr 2007
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Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:07/82

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Keywords: Bank supervision Governance Basel Core Principles Transparency

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Daniel C. L. Hardy, 2006. "Regulatory Capture in Banking," IMF Working Papers 06/34, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  2. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Hoeberichts, Marco & Schaling, Eric, 2000. "A Theory of Central Bank Accountability," CEPR Discussion Papers 2354, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Marc Quintyn & Michael Taylor, 2002. "Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability," IMF Working Papers 02/46, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  4. Eva H. G. Hupkes & Marc Quintyn & Michael Taylor, 2005. "The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors: Principles and Practice," IMF Working Papers 05/51, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  5. Udaibir S. Das & Marc Quintyn, 2002. "Crisis Prevention and Crisis Management: The Role of Regulatory Governance," IMF Working Papers 02/163, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  6. Barth, James R. & Caprio Jr., Gerard & Levine, Ross, 2001. "Bank regulation and supervision : what works best?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2725, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  7. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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