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Banking Supervision

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Author Info

  • Alessandro Gambini
  • Salim M. Darbar
  • Marco Arnone

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between the quality of banking supervision and governance of the supervisory agency, based on assessments of the Basel Core Principles and the IMF Code on Transparency in Financial Policies, covering 116 and 53 countries, respectively, with 51 common to both. We find a positive correlation between the transparency of the supervisor and the effectiveness of banking supervision; moreover, better accountability and integrity practices of the banking supervisors are associated with higher independence, which in turn is associated with better compliance with the Basel Core Principles. These results are largely robust to different stages of financial development.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 07/82.

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Length: 30
Date of creation: 01 Apr 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:07/82

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Related research

Keywords: Bank supervision; Governance; Basel Core Principles; banking supervision; banking; banking supervisors; banking sector; bank supervisors; payment systems; banking business; transparency requirements; deposit insurance; bank regulation; consolidated supervision; prudential supervision; supervisory agencies; licensing process; money laundering; banking supervisor; supervisory authorities; bank independence; supervisory agency; bank for international settlements; securities regulation; debt restructuring; bank licenses; financial sector supervisors; market participants; financial regulation; central banking; bank corruption; banking system; monetary policies; information exchange; financial system integrity; supervisory environment; licensing authority; assessment missions; enforcement powers; bank policy; bank group;

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References

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  1. Jean-François Segalotto & Marco Arnone & Bernard Laurens, 2006. "Measures of Central Bank Autonomy," IMF Working Papers 06/228, International Monetary Fund.
  2. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Hoeberichts, M.M. & Schaling, E., 1998. "A Theory of Central Bank Accountability," Discussion Paper 1998-103, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  3. James R. Barth & Gerard Caprio, Jr. & Ross Levine, 2002. "Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works Best?," NBER Working Papers 9323, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
  5. Eijffinger, S. & De Hann, J., 1995. "The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence," Papers 9587, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  6. Michael Taylor & Marc Quintyn & Eva H. G. Hüpkes, 2005. "The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors," IMF Working Papers 05/51, International Monetary Fund.
  7. J. De Haan & F. Amtenbrink & S.C.W. Eijffinger, 1999. "Accountability of central banks: aspects and quantification," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 52(209), pages 169-193.
  8. Thorsten Beck & Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Ross Levine, 2003. "Bank Supervision and Corporate Finance," NBER Working Papers 9620, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Udaibir S. Das & Marc Quintyn & Kina Chenard, 2004. "Does Regulatory Governance Matter for Financial System Stability? An Empirical Analysis," IMF Working Papers 04/89, International Monetary Fund.
  10. International Monetary Fund, 2006. "Regulatory Capture in Banking," IMF Working Papers 06/34, International Monetary Fund.
  11. Udaibir S. Das & Marc Quintyn, 2002. "Crisis Prevention and Crisis Management," IMF Working Papers 02/163, International Monetary Fund.
  12. Barth, James R. & Caprio Jr, Gerard & Levine, Ross, 2001. "The regulation and supervision of banks around the world - a new database," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2588, The World Bank.
  13. Michael Taylor & Marc Quintyn, 2002. "Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability," IMF Working Papers 02/46, International Monetary Fund.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Pratt, Richard & Berg, Alexander, 2014. "Governance of securities regulators : a framework," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6800, The World Bank.
  2. Paul Cavelaars & Jakob de Haan & Paul Hilbers & Bart Stellinga, 2013. "Challenges for financial sector supervision," DNB Occasional Studies 1106, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  3. Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn, 2013. "The Evolution of Financial Supervision: the Continuing Search for the Holy Grail," SUERF 50th Anniversary Volume Chapters, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
  4. Franka Liedorp & Robert Mosch & Carin van der Cruijsen & Jakob de Haan, 2013. "Transparency of Banking Supervisors," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 61(2), pages 310-335, June.
  5. Masciandaro, D. & Nieto, M. & Prast, H.M., 2007. "Financial Governance of Banking Supervision," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-381469, Tilburg University.
  6. Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn, 2008. "Institutions Matter: Financial Supervision Architecture, Central Bank and Path Dependence. General Trends and the South Eastern European Countries," Working Papers 89, Bank of Greece.
  7. Houssem Rachdi, 2010. "The Link between International Supervision and Banking Crises," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 57(3), pages 321-332, September.
  8. Marc Quintyn & Rosaria Vega Pansini & Donato Masciandaro, 2011. "The Economic Crisis," IMF Working Papers 11/261, International Monetary Fund.
  9. Marc Quintyn & Donato Masciandaro & María Nieto, 2009. "Will they Sing the Same Tune? Measuring Convergence in the New European System of Financial Supervisors," IMF Working Papers 09/142, International Monetary Fund.
  10. Marco Arnone & Pier Padoan, 2008. "Anti-money laundering by international institutions: a preliminary assessment," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 361-386, December.
  11. International Monetary Fund, 2011. "Compliance with the AM+L4776L/CFT International Standard," IMF Working Papers 11/177, International Monetary Fund.

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