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Audit Committees in Central Banks


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  • Kenneth Sullivan
  • Marie-Thérèse Camilleri Gilson
  • Tonny Lybek
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    This paper reviews the tasks and design of audit committees, increasingly recommended as a way to strengthen financial accountability and good central bank governance. It outlines the motivations for the establishment of audit committees in commercial corporations and public sector entities, and explains how audit committees interact with other governance bodies within a central bank. The paper focuses on the functions of an audit committee, since the terminology of the governance structure is often country-specific. It summarizes operational issues to consider in designing an effective audit committee and discusses the implications for central bank legislation.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 07/73.

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    Length: 48
    Date of creation: 01 Apr 2007
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:07/73

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    Postal: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA
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    Keywords: Central bank legislation; Accounting; audit committee; internal audit; audit committees; financial statements; corporate governance; internal control; bank law; banking; external auditor; national bank; board members; banking supervision; corporate law; board member; financial disclosure; fiduciary duties; bank of japan; conflicts of interest; bank governance; accounting framework; corporations; central banking; bank of latvia; commercial corporations; chief executive; banking publications; governance principles; bank for international settlements; financial reports; national association; compliance officer; auditor independence; bank operations; bank of thailand; bank act; bank laws; conflict of interest; shareholder wealth; corporation; principal-agent; corporate governance principles; bank of england; bank publications; financial performance; eastern caribbean central bank; commercial corporation; bank objectives; company law; stock exchange; corporate governance code; companies act; bank of spain; disclosure requirements; good corporate governance; exchange commission; corporate governance codes; corporate boards; governance system; corporate structure; corporate performance; bank reporting; board membership; financial information; fiduciary duty; independent directors; bank board; bank of botswana; corporate failure; company laws; corporate collapses; corporate board; corporate governance system; accounting treatment; electronic banking; chief financial officer; breach of duty; individual company; international reserve; accounting system; banking services; commercial enterprises; shareholders meeting; commercial transactions; bank staff; bank issues; bank credibility; fiduciary obligations; stock options; major shareholder; comparative corporate law; independent audit; boards of directors; independent audit committee; stock exchanges; financial statement; bank business; bank activities; comparative corporate governance; bank losses; financial transactions; chief accountant; share option; bank reports; off ? balance sheet; central bank credibility; monetary authority; director liability; banking supervisors; bank accounting; stakeholder theory; bank of canada; bankers; business lawyer; independence requirements; rights of shareholders; decentralization; exchange act; board meetings; business ethics; ex ante; governance responsibilities; bank transfers; regulatory approach; corporate finance; governance arrangements; capital base;

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Eliezer M. Fich & Anil Shivdasani, 2006. "Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 61(2), pages 689-724, 04.
    2. Joke Mooij, 2004. "Corporate Culture of Central Banks: Lessons from the Past," DNB Working Papers, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department 006, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    3. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2001. "Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature," NBER Working Papers 8161, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Klein, April, 2002. "Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 375-400, August.
    5. Frisell, Lars & Roszbach, Kasper F. & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2008. "Governing the Governors: A Clinical Study of Central Banks," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 6888, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Claudia Helene Dziobek & John W. Dalton, 2005. "Central Bank Losses and Experiences in Selected Countries," IMF Working Papers 05/72, International Monetary Fund.
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