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Precautionary Monetary and Fiscal Policies

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Author Info
Pelin Berkmen
Abstract

This paper explains why the debt reduction motive for countries that are subject to borrowing constraints and a volatile environment is greater than for those with a more stable environment and relatively better access to the financial markets. In particular, it shows that the possibility of losing the ability to borrow in the future induces precautionary debt reduction. When a government loses its ability to borrow, shocks are more costly to the economy, since they cannot be spread over time. The precautionary motive arises from the need to make these adjustments less painful when the borrowing constraints bind. To avoid large losses in the constrained period, the government prefers to raise taxes and inflation in earlier periods more than would be implied otherwise, leaving less debt to the future periods, and thereby shifting some of the required adjustment to the earlier periods. In other words, the coexistence of large shocks and borrowing constraints forces the government to be more prudent in its management of debt.

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Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 07/30.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 15 Feb 2007
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Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:07/30

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Keywords: Monetary policy ; fiscal policy ; debt ; precautionary motive ; Monetary policy ; Fiscal policy ; Debt ;

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  1. Arminio Fraga & Ilan Goldfajn & Andre Minella, 2003. "Inflation Targeting in Emerging Market Economies," NBER Working Papers 10019, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Reinhart, Carmen & Rogoff, Kenneth & Savastano, Miguel, 2003. "Debt intolerance," MPRA Paper 13932, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Andrea Schaechter & Marc Zelmer, 2000. "Adopting Inflation Targeting: Practical Issues for Emerging Market Countries," IMF Occasional Papers 202, International Monetary Fund.
  4. Barro, Robert J, 1979. "On the Determination of the Public Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 940-71, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. S. Rao Aiyagari & Albert Marcet & Thomas J. Sargent & Juha Seppala, 2002. "Optimal Taxation without State-Contingent Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(6), pages 1220-1254, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Siu, Henry E., 2004. "Optimal fiscal and monetary policy with sticky prices," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 575-607, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie & Uribe, Martin, 2004. "Optimal fiscal and monetary policy under sticky prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 198-230, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Zeldes, Stephen P, 1989. "Consumption and Liquidity Constraints: An Empirical Investigation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(2), pages 305-46, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Olivier Blanchard, 2004. "Fiscal Dominance and Inflation Targeting: Lessons from Brazil," NBER Working Papers 10389, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Kimball, Miles S, 1990. "Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the Large," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(1), pages 53-73, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Pierpaolo Benigno & Michael Woodford, 2003. "Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy: A Linear Quadratic Approach," NBER Working Papers 9905, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. repec:rus:hseeco:123922 is not listed on IDEAS
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