Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role of a Bankruptcy Regime
AbstractIn an environment characterized by weak contractual enforcement, sovereign lenders can enhance the likelihood of repayment by making their claims more difficult to restructure ex post. We show however, that competition for repayment among lenders may result in a sovereign debt that is excessively difficult to restructure in equilibrium. This inefficiency may be alleviated by a suitably designed bankruptcy regime that facilitates debt restructuring.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 07/192.
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2007
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA
Phone: (202) 623-7000
Fax: (202) 623-4661
Web page: http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Patrick Bolton & Olivier Jeanne, 2007. "Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role of a Bankruptcy Regime," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(6), pages 901-924, December.
- NEP-ALL-2007-09-16 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Barry Eichengreen, 2003. "Restructuring Sovereign Debt," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 75-98, Fall.
- Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 1998.
"Liquidity risk, liquidity creation and financial fragility: a theory of banking,"
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Sep.
- Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2001. "Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 287-327, April.
- Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 1999. "Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking," NBER Working Papers 7430, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, . "Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking," CRSP working papers 476, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
- Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1991.
"Sovereign Debt Repurchases: No Cure for Overhang,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 106(4), pages 1219-35, November.
- Jeromin Zettelmeyer & Kenneth Rogoff, 2002.
"Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns: A History of Ideas, 1976--2001,"
IMF Working Papers
02/133, International Monetary Fund.
- Kenneth Rogoff & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2002. "Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns: A History of Ideas, 1976-2001," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 49(3), pages 8.
- Ilya Segal, 1999. "Contracting With Externalities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(2), pages 337-388, May.
- Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1996. "Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 1-25, February.
- Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 1996. "Foundations of International Macroeconomics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262150476, January.
- Hallak, Issam, 2009. "Renegotiation and the pricing structure of sovereign bank loans: Empirical evidence," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 89-103, January.
- Bernardo Guimaraes, 2011.
"Sovereign default: which shocks matter?,"
Review of Economic Dynamics,
Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 14(4), pages 553-576, October.
- Bernardo Guimaraes, 2010. "Code files for "Sovereign default: which shocks matter?"," Computer Codes 09-166, Review of Economic Dynamics.
- Bolton, Patrick & Jeanne, Olivier, 2011.
"Sovereign Default Risk and Bank Fragility in Financially Integrated Economies,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
8358, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Patrick Bolton & Olivier Jeanne, 2011. "Sovereign Default Risk and Bank Fragility in Financially Integrated Economies," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 59(2), pages 162-194, June.
- Patrick Bolton & Olivier Jeanne, 2011. "Sovereign Default Risk and Bank Fragility in Financially Integrated Economies," NBER Working Papers 16899, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ang, Andrew & Longstaff, Francis A., 2013.
"Systemic sovereign credit risk: Lessons from the U.S. and Europe,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 60(5), pages 493-510.
- Andrew Ang & Francis A. Longstaff, 2011. "Systemic Sovereign Credit Risk: Lessons from the U.S. and Europe," NBER Working Papers 16982, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Yan Bai & Jing Zhang, 2009.
"Duration of Sovereign Debt Renegotiation,"
593, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
- Olivier Jeanne, 2009.
"Debt Maturity and the International Financial Architecture,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 2135-48, December.
- Olivier Jeanne, 2004. "Debt Maturity and the International Financial Architecture," IMF Working Papers 04/137, International Monetary Fund.
- Brown, Martin & Lane, Philip R., 2011. "Debt overhang in emerging Europe ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5784, The World Bank.
- Aitor Erce, 2013. "Sovereign debt crises: could an international court minimize them?," Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute Working Paper 142, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jim Beardow) or (Hassan Zaidi).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.