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Implementing Inflation Targeting: Institutional Arrangements, Target Design, and Communications

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Author Info
Marcel Peter
Geoffrey Heenan
Scott Roger

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Abstract

Transparency is a central element in most aspects of the design and operation of inflation targeting regimes. This paper focuses on three elements of inflation targeting most closely associated with transparency: (i) the institutional arrangements supporting inflation targeting; (ii) the specification of the inflation target; and (iii) the central bank's policy communications. The paper is primarily aimed at providing practical advice to countries planning to develop an inflation targeting framework, but many of the issues are relevant for any credible, independent monetary policy.

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Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 06/278.

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Length: 57 pages
Date of creation: 21 Dec 2006
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Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/278

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Keywords: Monetary policy ; inflation targeting ; Inflation targeting ; Monetary policy ;

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    Other versions:
  2. Jorge Canales-Kriljenko & Turgut Kisinbay & Rodolfo Maino & Eric Parrado, 2006. "Setting the Operational Framework for Producing Inflation Forecasts," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 362, Central Bank of Chile. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Paul Jackman, 2002. "The Reserve Bank's external communications," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 65, March. [Downloadable!]
  4. Michael Woodford, 2005. "Central bank communication and policy effectiveness," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Aug, pages 399-474. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Anita Tuladhar, 2005. "Governance Structures and Decision-Making Roles in Inflation-Targeting Central Banks," IMF Working Papers 05/183, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  6. Paul Conway, 2000. "Monetary policy in an uncertain world," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 63, September. [Downloadable!]
  7. Alain Ize, 2005. "Capitalizing Central Banks: A Net Worth Approach," IMF Working Papers 05/15, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  8. Malcolm Edey & Andrew Stone, 2004. "A Perspective on Monetary Policy Transparency and Communication," RBA Annual Conference Volume, in: Christopher Kent & Simon Guttmann (ed.), The Future of Inflation Targeting Reserve Bank of Australia. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Jean-Francois Segalotto & Marco Arnone & Bernard Laurens, 2006. "The Measurement of Central Bank Autonomy: Survey of Models, Indicators, and Empirical Evidence," IMF Working Papers 06/227, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2000. "What should central banks do?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Dec, pages 1-14. [Downloadable!]
  15. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, pages 195-225. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Seth B. Carpenter, 2004. "Transparency and monetary policy: what does the academic literature tell policymakers?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2004-35, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  17. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1972. "Expectations and the neutrality of money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 103-124, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  21. Scott Roger & Mark R. Stone, 2005. "On Target? The International Experience with Achieving Inflation Targets," IMF Working Papers 05/163, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Kateřina Šmídková & Aleš Bulíř, 2007. "Striving to Be “Clearly Open” and “Crystal Clear”: Monetary Policy Communication of the CNB," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 57(11-12), pages 540-557, December. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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