Goal-Independent Central Banks: Why Politicians Decide to Delegate

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Goal-Independent Central Banks: Why Politicians Decide to Delegate

Author Info

Christopher W. Crowe

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Christopher Crowe

Abstract

A motivation for central bank independence (CBI) is that policy delegation helps politicians manage diverse coalitions. This paper develops a model of coalition formation that predicts when delegation will occur. An analysis of policy preferences survey data and CBI indicators supports the predictions. Case studies, drawn from several countries' recent past and the nineteenth-century United States, provide further support. Finally, the model explains why the expected negative relationship between CBI and inflation is not empirically robust: endogenous selection biases the estimated effect towards zero. The data confirm this.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 06/256.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: 17 Nov 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/256

Contact details of provider:
Postal: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA
Phone: (202) 623-7000
Fax: (202) 623-4661
Email:
Web page: http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/pubs/ord_info.htm

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Other versions of this item:

Article
- Crowe, Christopher, 2008. "Goal independent central banks: Why politicians decide to delegate," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 748-762, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2007-01-06 (All new papers)
NEP-CBA-2007-01-06 (Central Banking)
NEP-HIS-2007-01-06 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
NEP-MAC-2007-01-06 (Macroeconomics)
NEP-MON-2007-01-06 (Monetary Economics)
NEP-POL-2007-01-06 (Positive Political Economics)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 286-336, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Ray, D. & Vohra, R., 1996. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure," Papers 68, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 1996. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure," Papers 0068, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 1998. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Working Papers 98-1, Brown University, Department of Economics, revised Jan 1998.
Bernhard, William & Leblang, David, 2002. "Political Parties and Monetary Commitments," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(04), pages 803-830, November. [Downloadable!]
Demange, Gabrielle, 1994. "Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 45-58, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Demange, G., 1991. "Intermediate Preferences and Stable Coalition Structures," DELTA Working Papers 91-16, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Singh, S K & Maddala, G S, 1976. "A Function for Size Distribution of Incomes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(5), pages 963-70, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Eric Le Borgne & Gauti B. Eggertsson, 2003. "A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence," IMF Working Papers 03/144, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
Vishnu Padayachee, 2001. "Central Bank transformation in a globalized world: the Reserve Bank in post-apartheid South Africa," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 13(6), pages 741-765. [Downloadable!]
Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, 1994. "Wage Indexation and Time Consistency," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 26(4), pages 941-50, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
McDonald, James B, 1984. "Some Generalized Functions for the Size Distribution of Income," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(3), pages 647-63, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Eijffinger, S-C-W & de Haan, J, 1996. "The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence," Princeton Studies in International Economics 19, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
Other versions:
- Eijffinger, S. & De Hann, J., 1995. "The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence," Papers 9587, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
William Bernhard & David Leblang, 2002. "Political Parties and Monetary Commitments," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 56(4), pages 803-830, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Christopher W. Crowe & Ellen E. Meade, 2008. "Central Bank Independence and Transparency: Evolution and Effectiveness," IMF Working Papers 08/119, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Christopher Crowe & Ellen E. Meade, 2007. "Central Bank Independence and Transparency: Evolution and Effectiveness," Working Papers 2007-20, American University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Crowe, Christopher & Meade, Ellen E., 2008. "Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 763-777, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ansgar Belke & Niklas Potrafke, 2009. "Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary Policy? – A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries," Ruhr Economic Papers 0094, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen. [Downloadable!]

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? No RePEc service, like IDEAS, charges for the use or the display of bibliographic data.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-20.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.