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Measures of Central Bank Autonomy: Empirical Evidence for OECD, Developing, and Emerging Market Economies

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Jean-Francois Segalotto
Marco Arnone
Bernard Laurens

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Abstract

This paper presents an update of the Grilli-Masciandaro-Tabellini (GMT) index of central bank (CB) autonomy, based on CB legislation as of end-2003. The index is applied to a set of OECD and developing countries, and emerging market economies. For a smaller set of countries, the paper presents a reconstruction of the GMT index based on Cukierman (1992) and assesses changes in CB autonomy between 1992 and 2003. The results point to a significant increase in CB autonomy, in particular for developing countries. In most cases, this improvement has involved a three-stage process: an initial stage in which the political foundations for CB autonomy are laid; a second stage in which operational autonomy develops; and a final stage in which CBs gain further political autonomy in terms of policy formulation and the appointment of senior management.

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Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 06/228.

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Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 19 Oct 2006
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Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/228

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Related research
Keywords: Central bank autonomy ; political autonomy ; economic autonomy ; Central banks ; Governance ; Monetary policy ; Developed countries ; Developing countries ; Emerging markets ;

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Alan S. Blinder, 1999. "Central Bank Credibility: Why Do We Care? How Do We Build It?," NBER Working Papers 7161, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Luis Jácome & Francisco Vázquez, 2005. "Any Link Between Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation? Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean," Macroeconomics 0508011, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Stanley Fischer, 1996. "Why are central banks pursuing long-run price stability?," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 7-34. [Downloadable!]
  5. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Jean-Francois Segalotto & Marco Arnone & Bernard Laurens, 2006. "The Measurement of Central Bank Autonomy: Survey of Models, Indicators, and Empirical Evidence," IMF Working Papers 06/227, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  7. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(3), pages 353-98, September.
  8. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, pages 195-225. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Sturm, Jan-Egbert & de Haan, Jakob, 2001. "Inflation in Developing Countries: Does Central Bank Independence Matter?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1993. "Designing institutions for monetary stability," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 53-84, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Christopher W. Crowe & Ellen E. Meade, 2008. "Central Bank Independence and Transparency: Evolution and Effectiveness," IMF Working Papers 08/119, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Jean-Francois Segalotto & Marco Arnone & Bernard Laurens, 2006. "The Measurement of Central Bank Autonomy: Survey of Models, Indicators, and Empirical Evidence," IMF Working Papers 06/227, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  3. Miguel Rueda, 2008. "Breaking Credibility in Monetary Policy: The Role of Politics in the Stability of the Central Banker," RES Working Papers 4585, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  4. Miguel Rueda, 2008. "Credibilidad en la política monetaria: Papel de políticas en la estabilidad del Presidente del Banco Central," RES Working Papers 4586, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  5. Alex Cukierman, 2006. "Central Bank Independence and Monetary Policymaking Institutions: Past, Present, and Future," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 360, Central Bank of Chile. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Andreas Freytag & Friedrich Schneider, 2007. "Monetary Commitment, Institutional Constraints and Inflation: Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries since the 1970s," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Tuesta Vicente, 2007. "Independencia Legal y Efectiva del Banco Central de Reserva del Perú," Working Papers 2007-012, Banco Central de Reserva del Perú. [Downloadable!]
  8. Alessandro Gambini & Marco Arnone & Salim M. Darbar, 2007. "Banking Supervision: Quality and Governance," IMF Working Papers 07/82, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  9. Ulrich H. Klueh & Peter Stella, 2008. "Central Bank Financial Strength and Policy Performance: An Econometric Evaluation," IMF Working Papers 08/176, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  10. Carl Walsh, 2007. "Inflation Targeting and the Role of Real Objectives," Research and Policy Notes 2007/02, Czech National Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
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