Measures of Central Bank Autonomy
AbstractThis paper presents an update of the Grilli-Masciandaro-Tabellini (GMT) index of central bank (CB) autonomy, based on CB legislation as of end-2003. The index is applied to a set of OECD and developing countries, and emerging market economies. For a smaller set of countries, the paper presents a reconstruction of the GMT index based on Cukierman (1992) and assesses changes in CB autonomy between 1992 and 2003. The results point to a significant increase in CB autonomy, in particular for developing countries. In most cases, this improvement has involved a three-stage process: an initial stage in which the political foundations for CB autonomy are laid; a second stage in which operational autonomy develops; and a final stage in which CBs gain further political autonomy in terms of policy formulation and the appointment of senior management.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 06/228.
Date of creation: 01 Oct 2006
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-11-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2006-11-25 (Central Banking)
- NEP-MON-2006-11-25 (Monetary Economics)
- NEP-POL-2006-11-25 (Positive Political Economics)
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