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Enforcement and the Stability and Growth Pact

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  • Anthony Annett
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    Abstract

    The Stability and Growth Pact has been a success in numerous EU countries, especially in guiding them toward underlying fiscal balance ahead of population aging. These countries tend to be smaller, subject to greater macroeconomic volatility, and reliant on a form of fiscal governance that emphasizes targets and contracts. Most of the new members share these characteristics. For the countries less compatible with the Pact, domestic governance reforms that increase the reputational costs for noncompliance can be useful complements to the fiscal framework.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 06/116.

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    Length: 34
    Date of creation: 01 May 2006
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/116

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    Keywords: European Union; Budget deficits; fiscal policy; fiscal governance; fiscal framework; fiscal performance; fiscal rules; fiscal discipline; fiscal balance; budgetary institutions; fiscal adjustment; fiscal policies; public debt; public finances; fiscal rule; fiscal institutions; discretionary fiscal policy; fiscal contracts; fiscal policy outcomes; structural fiscal; fiscal frameworks; fiscal contract; fiscal agencies; fiscal positions; fiscal profligacy; fiscal outcomes; fiscal sustainability; fiscal developments; budget balances; fiscal stability; excessive deficits; annual budget; fiscal balances; fiscal multipliers; fiscal records; cyclical fiscal policy; fiscal reforms; fiscal policy rules; fiscal surpluses; social insurance; fiscal stabilizers; excessive deficit procedure; fiscal agency; fiscal deficits; budget constraint; budget process; fiscal reaction function; fiscal data; fiscal behavior; fiscal difficulties; fiscal affairs; aggregate fiscal; fiscal authorities; fiscal projections; fiscal position; national budget; fiscal reaction; budgetary consolidation; tax payments; aggregate fiscal discipline; fiscal expansions; fiscal burden; budgetary rules; fiscal affairs department; fiscal targets;

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    Cited by:
    1. Kerstin Bernoth & Andrew Hughes Hallet & John Lewis, 2008. "Did fiscal policy makers know what they were doing? Reassessing fiscal policy with real-time data," DNB Working Papers, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department 169, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    2. Martin Cihák & Wim Fonteyne, 2009. "Five Years After," IMF Working Papers 09/68, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Rossana Merola & Javier J. Pérez, 2012. "Fiscal forecast errors: governments vs independent agencies?," Banco de Espa�a Working Papers 1233, Banco de Espa�a.
    4. Álvaro Pina & Nuno Venes, 2007. "The Political Economy of EDP Fiscal Forecasts: An Empirical Assessment," Working Papers Department of Economics, ISEG - School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, University of Lisbon 2007/23, ISEG - School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, University of Lisbon.
    5. Jakob Haan & Richard Jong-A-Pin & Jochen Mierau, 2013. "Do budgetary institutions mitigate the common pool problem? New empirical evidence for the EU," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 423-441, September.
    6. Agustín S. Bénétrix & Philip R. Lane, 2012. "Fiscal Cyclicality and EMU," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series, IIIS iiisdp403, IIIS.
    7. Győrffy, Dóra, 2008. "Költségvetési kiigazítás és növekedés az Európai Unióban. Tanulságok Magyarország számára
      [Budget adjustment and growth in the European Union lessons for Hungary]
      ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(11), pages 962-986.
    8. Frank A.G. den Butter & Mathieu L.L. Segers, 2014. "Prospects for an EMU between Federalism and Nationalism," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-008/VI, Tinbergen Institute.
    9. Beetsma, Roel & Giuliodori, Massimo, 2007. "On the Relationship between Fiscal Plans in the European Union: An Empirical Analysis Based on Real-Time Data," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 6088, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Muscatelli, Vito A. & Natale, Piergiovanna & Tirelli, Patrizio, 2012. "A simple and flexible alternative to Stability and Growth Pact deficit ceilings. Is it at hand?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 14-26.
    11. Cimadomo, Jacopo, 2008. "Fiscal policy in real time," Working Paper Series, European Central Bank 0919, European Central Bank.
    12. Iyabo Masha & Leighton Harris & Jian-Ye Wang & Kazuko Shirono, 2007. "The Common Monetary Area in Southern Africa," IMF Working Papers 07/158, International Monetary Fund.

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