In the presence of competing interest groups, this paper examines how the form of votebuying contracts affects policy outcomes. We study contracts contingent upon individual votes, policy outcomes, and/or vote shares. Voters either care about their individual votes, or about the policy outcome. We find that vote buying is cheaper when what can be contracted upon coincides with what voters care about. Vote buying becomes extremely costly, or even impossible, when there is no such coincidence. Finally, vote buying is extremely cheap, or even free, when contracts can be contingent upon both individual votes and vote shares.
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Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number
06/11.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Jackson, Matthew O. & Dekel, Eddie & Wolinsky, Asher, 2005.
"Vote buying,"
Working Papers
1215, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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Other versions:
Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 2004.
"Vote Buying,"
Discussion Papers
1386, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 2005.
"Vote Buying,"
Others
0503006, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!]