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Implementing the Stability and Growth Pact: Enforcement and Procedural Flexibility Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Roel M. W. J. Beetsma
Xavier Debrun
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The paper analyzes some key policy trade-offs involved in the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact. Greater "procedural" flexibility in the Pact's implementation may improve welfare. Procedural flexibility designates the enforcer's room to apply judgment on underlying policies and to set a consolidation path that does not discourage high-quality measures. Budgetary opaqueness may hinder the qualitative assessment of fiscal policy; therefore, better monitoring and greater transparency would increase the benefits from procedural flexibility. Overall, a simple deficit rule with conditional procedural flexibility can contain excessive deficits, lower unproductive spending, and increase high-quality outlays.
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Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number
05/59.
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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 28 Mar 2005Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/59Contact details of provider: Postal: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA Phone: (202) 623-7000 Fax: (202) 623-4661 Email: Web page: http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm More information through EDIRC
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For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Keywords: Fiscal reforms Stabilization measures Stabilization programs Budget deficits Structural adjustment Economic growth Other versions of this item:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Beetsma, Roel & Uhlig, Harald, 1999.
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Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, 2000.
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Hallett, Andrew Hughes & Jensen, Svend E. Hougaard & Richter, Christian, 2005.
"The European economy at the cross roads: Structural reforms, fiscal constraints, and the Lisbon Agenda ,"
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Sibert, Anne, 1999.
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Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Krogstrup, Signe & Wyplosz, Charles, 2006.
"A Common Pool Theory of Deficit Bias Correction ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5866, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ludger Schuknecht, 2004.
"EU fiscal rules: issues and lessons from political economy ,"
Working Paper Series
421, European Central Bank.
[Downloadable!]
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