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Government Debt: A Key Role in Financial Intermediation

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Author Info
Michael Kumhof
Evan Tanner

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Abstract

The literature on optimal fiscal policy finds that highly volatile real returns on government debt, for example through surprise inflation, have very low costs. However, policymakers are almost always very apprehensive of this option. The paper discusses evidence concerning features of developing country financial markets that are missing in existing models, and that may suggest why this policy is considered so costly in practice. Most importantly, domestic banks choose to be highly exposed to government debt because the alternative, private lending, is more risky under existing legal and institutional imperfections. This exposure makes banks and their borrowers vulnerable to the government's debt policy.

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Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 05/57.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 24 Mar 2005
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Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/57

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Related research
Keywords: Fiscal policy ; Taxation ; Inflation ; Public debt ;

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  2. Lucas, Robert Jr. & Stokey, Nancy L., 1983. "Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 55-93. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Michael J. Flemming, 2000. "Financial Market Implications of the Federal Debt Paydown," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 31(2000-2), pages 221-252. [Downloadable!]
  4. Michael J. Fleming, 2001. "Financial market implications of the federal debt paydown," Staff Reports 120, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  5. Michael Kumhof, 2004. "Fiscal Crisis Resolution: Taxation versus Inflation," Working Papers 102004, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research. [Downloadable!]
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  6. V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1999. "Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 6891, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Buera, Francisco & Nicolini, Juan Pablo, 2004. "Optimal maturity of government debt without state contingent bonds," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 531-554, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Siu, Henry E., 2004. "Optimal fiscal and monetary policy with sticky prices," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 575-607, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie & Uribe, Martin, 2004. "Optimal fiscal and monetary policy under sticky prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 198-230, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. George-Marios Angeletos, 2002. "Fiscal Policy With Noncontingent Debt And The Optimal Maturity Structure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(3), pages 1105-1131, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Vincent Reinhart & Brian Sack, 2000. "The Economic Consequences of Disappearing Government Debt," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 31(2000-2), pages 163-220. [Downloadable!]
  12. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Calvo, Guillermo A, 1978. "On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1411-28, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff & Miguel A. Savastano, 2003. "Debt Intolerance," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 34(2003-1), pages 1-74. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff & Miguel A. Savastano, 2003. "Debt Intolerance," NBER Working Papers 9908, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Reinhart, Carmen & Rogoff, Kenneth & Savastano, Miguel, 2003. "Debt intolerance," MPRA Paper 13932, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. F. Gulcin Ozkan & Ahmet Kipici & Mustafa Ismihan, 2008. "The Banking Sector, Government Bonds and Financial Intermediation: The Case of Emerging Market Countries," Discussion Papers 08/11, Department of Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
  2. Reinhart, Carmen & Vegh, Carlos & Velasco, Andres, 2008. "Money, Crises, and Transition Essays in Honor of Guillermo A. Calvo: An Introduction," MPRA Paper 13232, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez, 2009. "Long-duration bonds and sovereign defaults," Working Paper 08-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
  4. Anastasia Guscina, 2008. "Impact of Macroeconomic, Political, and Institutional Factors on the Structure of Government Debt in Emerging Market Countries," IMF Working Papers 08/205, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  5. Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & Horacio Sapriza, 2006. "Computing business cycles in emerging economy models," Working Paper 06-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
  6. Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & Horacio Sapriza, 2007. "Quantitative models of sovereign default and the threat of financial exclusion," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Sum, pages 251-286. [Downloadable!]
  7. Brutti, Filippo, 2008. "Legal enforcement, public supply of liquidity and sovereign risk," MPRA Paper 13949, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  8. Nicola Gennaioli & Alberto Martin & Stefano Rossi, 2009. "Institutions, Public Debt and Foreign Finance," Economics Working Papers 1170, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  9. David Hauner, 2006. "Fiscal Policy and Financial Development," IMF Working Papers 06/26, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  10. Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & Horacio Sapriza, 2008. "Heterogeneous borrowers in quantitative models of sovereign default," Working Paper 07-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
  11. Kevin Joseph Carey & Evan Tanner, 2005. "The Perils of Tax Smoothing: Sustainable Fiscal Policy with Random Shocks to Permanent Output," IMF Working Papers 05/207, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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