Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Did the Basel Accord Cause a Credit Slowdown in Latin America?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Thomas F. Cosimano
  • Ralph Chami
  • Adolfo Barajas

Abstract

Drawing from a unique data set comprising 2,893 banks and 152 countries over the period 1987 to 2000, we test whether the adoption of the Basel Accord by Latin American and Caribbean countries was responsible for the serious slowdowns in credit growth experienced by these countries. We find that, on average, both bank capitalization and lending activities in Latin America increased after Basel. Consequently, Basel did not seem to lead to an overall credit decline. However, we do find evidence that loan growth became more sensitive to some risk factors. Our study suggests that the upcoming adoption of Basel II might cause greater procyclicality of credit.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=17891
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 05/38.

as in new window
Length: 42
Date of creation: 01 Feb 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/38

Contact details of provider:
Postal: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA
Phone: (202) 623-7000
Fax: (202) 623-4661
Email:
Web page: http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/pubs/ord_info.htm

Related research

Keywords: Bank supervision; Latin America; Basel Core Principles; Credit; Monetary policy; basel accord; banking; capital requirements; deposit insurance; bank loans; bank risk; bank capital; bank behavior; arbitrage; credit risk; banking system; nonperforming loan; bank credit; banking systems; moral hazard; net interest margin; risk-weighted assets; capital adequacy; bank assets; bank lending; bank for international settlements; bank regulation; bank deposits; capital regulation; emerging markets; capital adequacy ratio; financial systems; banking crisis; bank activities; bank failures; bank capitalization; deposit insurance systems; return on equity; banks ? loan; banking crises; bank competition; banking regulation; insurance systems; bank risk-taking; return on assets; risk management; bank stock; bank panics; banking sectors; tier 1 capital; prudential regulation; capital budgeting; supervisory authorities; banking activities; central banking; bank capital regulation; contingent liabilities; bank of england; deposit insurance scheme; banking industry; bank intermediation; banking supervision; bank loan; bank balance sheets; banking sector; bank runs; market risk; banking market; probability of default; bank stability; federal deposit insurance; banks ? balance sheets; bank managers; risk taking; bank lending behavior; bank crisis; bank performance; bank stock prices; supervisory framework; bank safety;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Nicola Cetorelli, 2001. "Banking Market Structure, Financial Dependence and Growth: International Evidence from Industry Data," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(2), pages 617-648, 04.
  2. Dimitrios Tsomocos & Eva Catarineu-Rabell & Patricia Jackson, 2003. "Procyclicality and the new Basel Accord–banks’ choice of loan rating system," FMG Discussion Papers dp464, Financial Markets Group.
  3. Barth, James R. & Caprio Jr., Gerard & Levine, Ross, 2001. "Bank regulation and supervision : what works best?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2725, The World Bank.
  4. Adolfo Barajas & Roberto Steiner, 2002. "Credit Stagnation in Latin America," IMF Working Papers 02/53, International Monetary Fund.
  5. Koehn, Michael & Santomero, Anthony M, 1980. " Regulation of Bank Capital and Portfolio Risk," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 35(5), pages 1235-44, December.
  6. Edward J. Kane, 2001. "Using Deferred Compensation to Strengthen the Ethicsof Financial Regulation," NBER Working Papers 8399, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, 1994. "Did risk-based capital allocate bank credit and cause a "credit crunch" in the United States?," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 585-633.
  8. Anil Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, 2004. "Cyclical implications of the Basel II capital standards," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Q I, pages 18-31.
  9. S. Baranzoni & P. Bianchi & L. Lambertini, 2000. "Market Structure," Working Papers 368, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  10. von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 2004. "Bank capital adequacy regulation under the new Basel Accord," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 90-95, April.
  11. Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren, 1991. "The capital crunch: neither a borrower nor a lender be," Working Papers 91-4, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
  12. Eric S. Rosengren & Joe Peek, 2000. "Collateral Damage: Effects of the Japanese Bank Crisis on Real Activity in the United States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 30-45, March.
  13. Allen N. Berger & Richard J. Herring & Giorgio P. Szegö, 1995. "The Role of Capital in Financial Institutions," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 95-01, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
  14. G. Dionne & T. M. Harchaoui, 2002. "Banks’ Capital, Securitization and Credit Risk : An Empirical Evidence for Canada," THEMA Working Papers 2002-33, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  15. De Bandt, Olivier & Davis, E. Philip, 2000. "Competition, contestability and market structure in European banking sectors on the eve of EMU," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1045-1066, June.
  16. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1986. "Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 251-269, June.
  17. Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 1994. "The prudential regulation of banks," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9539, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  18. Maria Concetta Chiuri & Giovanni Ferri & Giovanni Majnoni, 2000. "The Macroeconomic Impact Of Bank Capital Requirements In Emerging Economies: Past Evidence To Assess The Future," series 0002, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Metodi Matematici - Università di Bari, revised Sep 2000.
  19. David A. Marshall & Edward S. Prescott, 2000. "Bank capital regulation with and without state-contingent penalties," Working Paper Series WP-00-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  20. Sunil Sharma & Ralph Chami & Mohsin S. Khan, 2003. "Emerging Issues in Banking Regulation," IMF Working Papers 03/101, International Monetary Fund.
  21. David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn.
  22. Claessens, Stijn & Laeven, Luc, 2004. "What Drives Bank Competition? Some International Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 36(3), pages 563-83, June.
  23. Ralph Chami & Thomas F. Cosimano, 2001. "Monetary Policy with a touch of Basel," IMF Working Papers 01/151, International Monetary Fund.
  24. Estrella, Arturo, 2004. "The cyclical behavior of optimal bank capital," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 1469-1498, June.
  25. Jones, David, 2000. "Emerging problems with the Basel Capital Accord: Regulatory capital arbitrage and related issues," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 35-58, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Ghosh, Saibal, 2010. "Credit Growth, Bank Soundness and Financial Fragility: Evidence from Indian Banking Sector," MPRA Paper 24715, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Birgit Schmitz, 2007. "The impact of Basel I capital regulation on bank deposits and loans: Empirical evidence for Europe," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2006 42, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
  3. Alicia García-Herrero & Sergio Gavilá, 2006. "Posible impacto de Basilea II en los países emergentes," Banco de Espa�a Occasional Papers 0606, Banco de Espa�a.
  4. Burton A. Abrams & Russell F. Settle, 2003. "Do Fixed Exchange Rates Fetter Monetary Policy? A Credit View," Working Papers 03-09, University of Delaware, Department of Economics.
  5. Ralph Chami & Thomas F. Cosimano, 2001. "Monetary Policy with a touch of Basel," IMF Working Papers 01/151, International Monetary Fund.
  6. Torsten Wezel & Mario Mansilla & Gustavo Adler, 2009. "Modernizing Bank Regulation in Support of Financial Deepening," IMF Working Papers 09/199, International Monetary Fund.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/38. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jim Beardow) or (Hassan Zaidi).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.