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A (New) Country Insurance Facility

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  • Tito Cordella
  • Eduardo Levy Yeyati

Abstract

To cope with the self-fulfilling liquidity runs that triggered many recent financial crises, we propose the creation of a country insurance facility. The facility, which we envisage as complementary to the existing multilateral lending facilities, would provide eligible countries with automatic access to a credit line at a predetermined interest rate. Eligibility criteria should be easily verifiable, focus on debt sustainability, and take into account the currency and maturity composition of the debt. Other critical design issues considered here include the size of the facility, its duration and charges, and the exit costs for a country that loses eligibility.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 05/23.

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Length: 33
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/23

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References

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  1. Ricardo J. Caballero & Stavros Panageas, 2003. "Hedging Sudden Stops and Precautionary Contractions," NBER Working Papers 9778, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Cordella, Tito & Yeyati, Eduardo Levy, 2003. "Bank bailouts: moral hazard vs. value effect," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 300-330, October.
  3. Kaplan, Ethan & Rodrik, Dani, 2001. "Did the Malaysian Capital Controls Work?," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 2754, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Romain Ranciere & Aaron Tornell & Frank Westermann, 2004. "Crises and Growth: A Re-evaluation," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 832, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. Charles A. E. Goodhart & Haizhou Huang, 1999. "A model of the lender of last resort," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  6. Eduardo Borensztein & Paolo Mauro, 2004. "The case for GDP-indexed bonds," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 19(38), pages 165-216, 04.
  7. Calvo, Guillermo A, 1988. "Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 647-61, September.
  8. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
  9. Stanley Fischer, 1999. "On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 85-104, Fall.
  10. Morris Goldstein, 2001. "IMF Structural Conditionality: How Much is Too Much?," Working Paper Series, Peterson Institute for International Economics WP01-4, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
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Cited by:
  1. Barry Eichengreen, 2007. "Insurance Underwriter or Financial Development Fund: What Role for Reserve Pooling in Latin America?," Open Economies Review, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 27-52, February.
  2. Jonathan David Ostry & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2005. "Strengthening IMF Crisis Prevention," IMF Working Papers 05/206, International Monetary Fund.
  3. Kapp, Daniel & Vega, Marco, 2012. "Real output costs of financial crises: a loss distribution approach," MPRA Paper 35706, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Irwin, Gregor & Penalver, Adrian & Salmon, Chris & Taylor, Ashley, 2008. "Dealing with country diversity: challenges for the IMF credit union model," Bank of England working papers, Bank of England 349, Bank of England.
  5. Daniel Kapp, 2012. "The optimal size of the European Stability Mechanism: A cost-benefit analysis," DNB Working Papers, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department 349, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  6. World Bank, 2008. "Country Insurance : Reducing Systemic Vulnerabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean," World Bank Other Operational Studies 8010, The World Bank.
  7. Alain Ize & Miguel Kiguel & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2005. "Managing Systemic Liquidity Risk in Financially Dollarized Economy," Business School Working Papers, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella managsystrisk, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
  8. Barry J. Eichengreen & Poonam Gupta & Ashoka Mody, 2006. "Sudden Stops and IMF-Supported Programs," IMF Working Papers 06/101, International Monetary Fund.
  9. Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2006. "Liquidity Insurance in a Financially Dollarized Economy," NBER Working Papers 12345, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Didier, Tatiana & Mauro, Paolo & Schmukler, Sergio L., 2008. "Vanishing financial contagion?," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 775-791.
  11. Suman S. Basu & Ran Bi & Prakash Kannan, 2010. "Regional reserve pooling arrangements," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Oct.
  12. Kapp, Daniel & Vega, Marco, 2012. "The Real Output Costs of Financial Crisis: A Loss Distribution Approach," Working Papers, Banco Central de Reserva del Perú 2012-013, Banco Central de Reserva del Perú.
  13. Presbitero, Andrea F. & Zazzaro, Alberto, 2012. "IMF Lending in Times of Crisis: Political Influences and Crisis Prevention," World Development, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 40(10), pages 1944-1969.
  14. Antonio Francisco A. Silva Jr, 2011. "The Self-insurance Role of International Reserves and the 2008-2010 Crisis," Working Papers Series, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department 256, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.

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