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Strengthening IMF Crisis Prevention

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Author Info

  • Jonathan David Ostry
  • Jeromin Zettelmeyer

Abstract

To better fulfill its crisis-prevention mandate, IMF surveillance needs to provide stronger incentives for countries to follow good policies and for markets to avoid boom-bust cycles in capital flows. To this end, surveillance should culminate in a summary public assessment of the quality of a country''s policies and stipulate the actions needed to address shortcomings. A country''s potential access to IMF credits should be linked to the quality of its policies in noncrisis periods in order to create stronger incentives for better policies and reduce incentives for capital to flow where it cannot be used in socially beneficial ways.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 05/206.

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Length: 23
Date of creation: 01 Nov 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/206

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Related research

Keywords: International Monetary Fund; Exchange rate policy surveillance; crisis prevention; capital markets; crisis lending; financial crises; capital inflows; capital flows; moral hazard; global capital markets; crisis resolution; private capital markets; debt restructuring; debt structure; capital adequacy; pre-crisis; access to international capital; private capital; access to private capital markets; debt crisis; international capital; international capital markets; contagion; capital market; banking crises; international ? contagion; bank regulation; government securities; asian crisis; economic crisis; financial crisis; large-scale crisis lending; excessive capital inflows; loss of confidence; market asset; capital standards; cross-country experience; early warning systems; current account deficits; international financial crises; international crisis; financial liberalization; currency crisis; currency crises; capital market access; banking crisis; capital accounts; deposit insurance; corporate sector; international debt crisis; capital account crises;

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References

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  1. Mehrez, Gil & Kaufmann, Daniel, 2000. "Transparency, liberalization, and banking crisis," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2286, The World Bank.
  2. Swati R. Ghosh & Atish R. Ghosh, 2003. "Structural Vulnerabilities and Currency Crises," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 50(3), pages 7.
  3. Nouriel Roubini & Paolo Manasse, 2005. "Rules of Thumb for Sovereign Debt Crises," IMF Working Papers 05/42, International Monetary Fund.
  4. Michael D. Bordo & Barry Eichengreen, 1998. "Implications of the Great Depression for the Development of the International Monetary System," NBER Chapters, in: The Defining Moment: The Great Depression and the American Economy in the Twentieth Century, pages 403-454 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Vijay Kelkar & Vikash Yadav & Praveen Chaudhry, 2004. "Reforming the Governance of the International Monetary Fund," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(5), pages 727-743, 05.
  6. Barth, James R. & Caprio, Gerard Jr. & Levine, Ross, 2004. "Bank regulation and supervision: what works best?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 205-248, April.
  7. Tito Cordella y Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2005. "A (New) Country Insurance Facility," Business School Working Papers newcountryins, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
  8. Raghuram G. Rajan, 2005. "Institutional Reform and Sovereign Debt Crises," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 25(1), pages 17-24, Winter.
  9. Walter B. Wriston, 1998. "Dumb Networks and Smart Capital," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 17(3), Winter.
  10. Charles W. Calomiris, 1998. "The IMF's Imprudent Role As Lender of Last Resort," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 17(3), pages 275-294, Winter.
  11. Graciela L. Kaminsky & Carmen M. Reinhart, 1996. "The twin crises: the causes of banking and balance-of-payments problems," International Finance Discussion Papers 544, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  12. James M. Boughton, 2004. "The IMF and the force of History," IMF Working Papers 04/75, International Monetary Fund.
  13. Yongseok Shin & Rachel Glennerster, 2003. "Is Transparency Good for You, and Can the IMF Help?," IMF Working Papers 03/132, International Monetary Fund.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Barry Eichengreen & Poonam Gupta & Ashoka Mody, 2008. "Sudden Stops and IMF-Supported Programs," NBER Chapters, in: Financial Markets Volatility and Performance in Emerging Markets, pages 219-266 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Bessma Momani, 2007. "IMF staff: Missing link in fund reform proposals," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 39-57, March.
  3. Jorge Carrera & Luis N. Lanteri, 2007. "Macroeconomic Shocks and Financial Vulnerability," Ensayos Económicos, Central Bank of Argentina, Economic Research Department, vol. 1(48), pages 13-71, July - Se.
  4. Marcel Fratzscher & Julien Reynaud, 2010. "IMF Surveillance and Financial Markets - A Political Economy Analysis," CESifo Working Paper Series 3089, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. C. Randall Henning, 2011. "Coordinating Regional and Multilateral Financial Institutions," Working Paper Series WP11-9, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
  6. Jeanne, Olivier & Ostry, Jonathan D & Zettelmeyer, Jeronimo, 2008. "A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality," CEPR Discussion Papers 7022, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. World Bank, 2008. "Country Insurance : Reducing Systemic Vulnerabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean," World Bank Other Operational Studies 8010, The World Bank.
  8. Daniel Kapp, 2012. "The optimal size of the European Stability Mechanism: A cost-benefit analysis," DNB Working Papers 349, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.

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