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Governance Structures and Decision-Making Roles in Inflation-Targeting Central Banks

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  • Anita Tuladhar
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    Abstract

    This paper surveys decision-making roles of governing bodies of central banks that have formally adopted inflation targeting as a monetary framework. Governance practices seek to balance institutional independence needed for monetary policy credibility with accountability required to protect democratic values. Central bank laws usually have price stability as the primary monetary policy objective but seldom require an explicit numerical inflation target. Governments are frequently involved in setting targets, but to ensure operational autonomy, legal provisions explicitly limit government influence in internal policy decision-making processes. Internal governance practices differ considerably with regard to the roles and inter-relationships between the policy, supervisory, and management boards of a central bank.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 05/183.

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    Length: 27
    Date of creation: 01 Sep 2005
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/183

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    Related research

    Keywords: Inflation targeting; Governance; Price stabilization;

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

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    1. Tomás J. T. Baliño & Charles Enoch & William E. Alexander, 1995. "The Adoption of Indirect Instruments of Monetary Policy," IMF Occasional Papers 126, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Frederic Mishkin & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, 2002. "A Decade of Inflation Targeting in the World: What Do We Know and What Do We Need to Know?," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Norman Loayza & Raimundo Soto & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Series Editor) (ed.), Inflation Targeting: Desing, Performance, Challenges, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 4, pages 171-220 Central Bank of Chile.
    3. Marta Campillo & Jeffrey A. Miron, 1997. "Why Does Inflation Differ across Countries?," NBER Chapters, in: Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy, pages 335-362 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March.
    5. Murray Sherwin., 2000. "Institutional frameworks for inflation targeting?," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 63, December.
    6. Carlo Cottarelli & Curzio Giannini, 1997. "Credibility Without Rules," IMF Occasional Papers 154, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Marc Zelmer & Andrea Schaechter & Mark R. Stone & Alina Carare, 2002. "Establishing Initial Conditions in Support of Inflation Targeting," IMF Working Papers 02/102, International Monetary Fund.
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    Cited by:
    1. Marcel Peter & Scott Roger & Geoffrey Heenan, 2006. "Implementing Inflation Targeting: Institutional Arrangements, Target Design, and Communications," IMF Working Papers 06/278, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Helge Berger & Volker Nitsch & Tonny Lybek, 2007. "Central Bank Boards around the World: Why does Membership Size Differ?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1897, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Dumitriu, Ramona & Stefanescu, Răzvan, 2013. "Decizii strategice ale politicii monetare
      [Strategic decisions of the Monetary Policy]
      ," MPRA Paper 51242, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Nov 2013.
    4. Scott Roger, 2009. "Inflation Targeting at 20: Achievements and Challenges," IMF Working Papers 09/236, International Monetary Fund.

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