We provide a framework for analyzing the choice between optimal and robust monetary policy rules in the presence of paradigm uncertainty. We first discuss the conditions on uncertainty that render a robust rule preferable to an optimal rule. Second, we show how the degree of risk aversion of the policymaker increases the region in which the robust rule is preferred.
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Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number
04/96.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Glenn Rudebusch & Lars E.O. Svensson, 1999.
"Policy Rules for Inflation Targeting,"
NBER Chapters,
in: Monetary Policy Rules, pages 203-262
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!]
Nicoletta Batini & Andrew Haldane, 1999.
"Forward-Looking Rules for Monetary Policy,"
NBER Chapters,
in: Monetary Policy Rules, pages 157-202
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!]
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