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Central Bank Governance: A Survey of Boards and Management Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics JoAnne Morris
Tonny Lybek
This paper identifies issues to consider when designing the structure, size, and composition of the governing boards and management of a central bank. While central bank autonomy and accountability are generally accepted as good practice, there is less consensus regarding the structure, size, and composition of the governing bodies. This paper surveys 101 central bank laws covering 113 countries and classifies the governance structure according to degree of autonomy, functions performed, size, composition, appointment procedures, and terms of the members. The paper concludes that an appropriate balance must be struck between the functions of the governing entities, simplicity, and country specific factors. The functions of the various bodies follow logically if a greater appreciation exists for the type of autonomy delegated to the central bank.
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Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number
04/226.
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Length: 52 pages
Date of creation: 17 Dec 2004Date of revision:
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Keywords: Central banks ; Governance ; Central bank role ; Other versions of this item:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
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