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Central Bank Governance: A Survey of Boards and Management

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  • JoAnne Morris
  • Tonny Lybek
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    Abstract

    This paper identifies issues to consider when designing the structure, size, and composition of the governing boards and management of a central bank. While central bank autonomy and accountability are generally accepted as good practice, there is less consensus regarding the structure, size, and composition of the governing bodies. This paper surveys 101 central bank laws covering 113 countries and classifies the governance structure according to degree of autonomy, functions performed, size, composition, appointment procedures, and terms of the members. The paper concludes that an appropriate balance must be struck between the functions of the governing entities, simplicity, and country specific factors. The functions of the various bodies follow logically if a greater appreciation exists for the type of autonomy delegated to the central bank.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 04/226.

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    Length: 53
    Date of creation: 01 Dec 2004
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:04/226

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    Related research

    Keywords: Central bank role;

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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    Cited by:
    1. Iftekhar Hasan & Loretta J Mester, 2008. "Central Bank Institutional Structure and Effective Central Banking: Cross-Country Empirical Evidence," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 50(4), pages 620-645, December.
    2. Donato Masciandaro & María J. Nieto & Henriëtte Prast, 2007. "Financial governance of banking supervision," Banco de Espa�a Working Papers 0725, Banco de Espa�a.
    3. Frisell, Lars & Roszbach, Kasper F. & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2008. "Governing the Governors: A Clinical Study of Central Banks," CEPR Discussion Papers 6888, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Szilárd Erhart & Jose Luis Vasquez-Paz, 2008. "Determinants of the size of a monetary policy committee: Theory and cross country evidence," Working Papers 2008-001, Banco Central de Reserva del Perú.
    5. Mihailovici, Gabriela & Lindner, Isabella, 2013. "Understanding Central Banks’ Role in Enlargement – Governance Issues," Focus on European Economic Integration, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue 1.
    6. Szilárd Erhart & Jose-Luis Vasquez-Paz, 2007. "Optimal monetary policy committee size: Theory and cross country evidence," MNB Working Papers 2007/6, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (the central bank of Hungary).
    7. Scott Roger, 2009. "Inflation Targeting at 20: Achievements and Challenges," IMF Working Papers 09/236, International Monetary Fund.
    8. Siklos, Pierre L., 2008. "No single definition of central bank independence is right for all countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 802-816, December.
    9. Xavier Freixas, 2009. "Monetary policy in a systemic crisis," Economics Working Papers 1200, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    10. Xavier Freixas & Bruno Maria Parigi, 2008. "Lender of Last Resort and Bank Closure Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 2286, CESifo Group Munich.
    11. Yanliang Miao, 2009. "In Search of Successful Inflation Targeting: Evidence from an Inflation Targeting Index," IMF Working Papers 09/148, International Monetary Fund.
    12. Marc Quintyn, 2009. "Independent agencies: more than a cheap copy of independent central banks?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 267-295, September.
    13. Mark R. Stone & Etienne B. Yehoue & Kotaro Ishi, 2009. "Unconventional Central Bank Measures for Emerging Economies," IMF Working Papers 09/226, International Monetary Fund.
    14. Marcel Peter & Scott Roger & Geoffrey Heenan, 2006. "Implementing Inflation Targeting: Institutional Arrangements, Target Design, and Communications," IMF Working Papers 06/278, International Monetary Fund.

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