On the Design and Effectiveness of Targeted Expenditure Programs
AbstractThis paper argues that both horizontal and intertemporal competition among recipient governments are needed in order to ensure incentives for effective utilization of targeted transfers. This has implications for budgeting frameworks and the types of information needed that might be amenable to formal contracting between the levels of government.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 04/220.
Date of creation: 01 Nov 2004
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-10-22 (All new papers)
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