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A Model of the IMF as a Coinsurance Arrangement

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Author Info
Ilhyock Shim
Ralph Chami
Sunil Sharma

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 04/219.

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Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: 03 Dec 2004
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Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:04/219

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Related research
Keywords: Conditionality ; Economic models ;

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Tito Cordella & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2004. "Country Insurance," Business School Working Papers countryinsurance, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. James M. Boughton, 2004. "The IMF and the Force of History: Ten Events and Ten Ideas that Have Shaped the Institution," IMF Working Papers 04/75, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  3. Jeanne, Olivier & Wyplosz, Charles, 2001. "The International Lender of Last Resort: How Large is Large Enough?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2842, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Bernheim, B Douglas & Shleifer, Andrei & Summers, Lawrence H, 1985. "The Strategic Bequest Motive," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1045-76, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Michael Mussa, 1999. "Reforming the International Financial Architecture: Limiting Moral Hazard and Containing Real Hazard," RBA Annual Conference Volume, in: David Gruen & Luke Gower (ed.), Capital Flows and the International Financial System Reserve Bank of Australia. [Downloadable!]
  6. Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jorgen W, 1988. "Altruism and Time Consistency: The Economics of Fait Accompli," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(6), pages 1165-82, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "A Theory of Social Interactions," NBER Working Papers 0042, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Rajan, Raghuram G. & Zingales, Luigi, 2000. "The tyranny of inequality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 521-558, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Cox, Donald, 1987. "Motives for Private Income Transfers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(3), pages 508-46, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Morris Goldstein, 2000. "Strengthening the International Financial Architecture: Where Do We Stand?," Peterson Institute Working Paper Series WP00-8, Peterson Institute for International Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Mohsin S. Khan & Sunil Sharma, 2001. "IMF Conditionality and Country Ownership of Programs," IMF Working Papers 01/142, International Monetary Fund.
  12. Bruce, Neil & Waldman, Michael, 1990. "The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(1), pages 155-65, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Hendrik JØrges, 2000. "Of rotten kids and Rawlsian parents: The optimal timing of intergenerational transfers," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 147-157. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Bernheim, B Douglas & Stark, Oded, 1988. "Altruism within the Family Reconsidered: Do Nice Guys Finish Last?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1034-45, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Jaewoo Lee, 2004. "Insurance Value of International Reserves: An Option Pricing Approach," IMF Working Papers 04/175, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  16. Stanley Fischer, 1999. "On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 85-104, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Graham Bird, 2007. "The Imf: A Bird'S Eye View Of Its Role And Operations," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 21(4), pages 683-745, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Chami, Ralph, 1996. "King Lear's dilemma: Precommitment versus the last word," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 171-176, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Bordo, Michael D. & Schwartz, Anna J., 1999. "Under what circumstances, past and present, have international rescues of countries in financial distress been successful?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 683-708, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  20. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Ales Bulir & Atish R. Ghosh & A. Javier Hamann & Timothy D. Lane & Alex Mourmouras & Marianne Schulze-Gattas, 2002. "IMF-Supported Programs in Capital Account Crises: Design and Experience," IMF Occasional Papers 210, International Monetary Fund.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Barry Eichengreen & Poonam Gupta & Ashoka Mody, 2006. "Sudden Stops and IMF-Supported Programs," NBER Working Papers 12235, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Olivier Jeanne & Jonathan David Ostry & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2008. "A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality," IMF Working Papers 08/236, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Barry Eichengreen, 2007. "Insurance Underwriter or Financial Development Fund: What Role for Reserve Pooling in Latin America?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 27-52, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Anna Ivanova, 2006. "Outcomes-Based Conditionality: Its Role and Optimal Design," IMF Working Papers 06/128, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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