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An Institutional Framework for Comparing Emerging Market Currency Boards

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  • Marie-Thérèse Camilleri Gilson
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    Abstract

    This paper offers an in-depth review of the institutional arrangements underlying existing currency boards (CBAs) in Argentina (until 2001), Eastern Europe, and Asia. An index of precommitment is derived from an analysis of legislative frameworks and monetary policy operations. The index covers features associated with monetary and exchange rate credibility such as: (i) clarity of legal basis, (ii) quality of reserve coverage, (iii) coverage of monetary aggregates, (iv) claims on reserves, (v) operational autonomy, (vi) transparency and accountability, and (vii) escape clauses. The paper concludes with a discussion of flexibility and credibility trade-offs and exit issues.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 04/180.

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    Length: 42
    Date of creation: 01 Sep 2004
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:04/180

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    Related research

    Keywords: Currency boards; Asia; Emerging markets; exchange rate; inflation; central bank; monetary policy; monetary fund; fixed exchange rate; exchange rate regime; money supply; monetary aggregates; monetary authorities; real exchange rate; exchange rate peg; national bank; monetary liabilities; monetary authority; liquidity management; monetary base; exchange rate regimes; exchange rates; monetary institutions; exchange rate depreciation; monetary aggregate; exchange rate policy; foreign exchange; exchange rate stability; fixed exchange rate regimes; hong kong monetary authority; exchange rate misalignment; exchange rate policies; fixed exchange rate regime; exchange rate flexibility; monetary framework; reserve requirements; exchange rate appreciation; money market; monetary policy operations; monetary target; monetary frameworks; monetary stabilization; reserve currencies; currency convertibility; monetary expansion; exchange rate pegs; hard currency; fixed exchange rates; money demand; future real exchange rate; real exchange rate appreciation; exchange rate mechanism; nominal exchange rate; exchange rate instability; monetary reform; exchange rate parity; exchange rate instrument; adjustable exchange rate; monetary dynamics; monetary policies; monetary assets; monetary targets; fixed exchange rate peg; currency areas; monetary conditions; exchange rate devaluation; exchange rate uncertainty; alternative exchange rate regime; exchange rate targets; monetary regimes; real exchange rate misalignment; monetary transmission mechanism; tight monetary stance; foreign exchange market; exchange rate arrangements; monetary systems; currency substitution; basket of currencies; monetary management; monetary anchor; intermediate monetary target; expansionary monetary policy; monetary economics; money markets; flexible exchange rate; domestic government securities; monetary policy instrument; currency risk; treasury securities; monetary stability; monetary stance; monetary transmission; monetary policy discretion; flexible exchange rate regime; government securities; alternative exchange rate; discretionary monetary policy; real exchange rate depreciation;

    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, December.
    3. Marek Belka & Jens Thomsen & Kim Abildgren & Pietro Catte & Pietro Cova & Patrizio Pagano & Ignazio Visco & Petar Chobanov & Amine Lahiani & Nikolay Nenovsky & Cristina Badarau & Grégory Levieuge & T, 2011. "Monetary Policy after the Crisis," SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum, number 2011/3 edited by Ernest Gnan, & Ryszard Kokoszczynski & Tomasz Łyziak & Robert McCauley.
    4. Walsh, Carl E, 1999. "Announcements, Inflation Targeting and Central Bank Incentives," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 66(262), pages 255-69, May.
    5. Alan S. Blinder, 1999. "Central Bank Credibility: Why Do We Care? How Do We Build It?," NBER Working Papers 7161, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
    7. Alain Ize & Arto Kovanen & Timo Henckel, 1999. "Central Banking without Central Bank Money," IMF Working Papers 99/92, International Monetary Fund.
    8. Klein, Michael W. & Marion, Nancy P., 1997. "Explaining the duration of exchange-rate pegs," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 387-404, December.
    9. repec:fth:harver:1496 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Stefan E. Oppers, 2000. "Dual Currency Boards," IMF Working Papers 00/199, International Monetary Fund.
    11. Krugman, Paul, 1979. "A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(3), pages 311-25, August.
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    Cited by:
    1. Pablo Druck & Mario Dehesa, 2008. "The Eastern Caribbean Central Bank," IMF Working Papers 08/214, International Monetary Fund.

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