Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Banking Competition, Risk, and Regulation

Contents:

Author Info

  • Alexander F. Tieman
  • Wilko Bolt

Abstract

In a dynamic theoretical framework, commercial banks compete for customers by setting acceptance criteria for granting loans, taking regulatory requirements into account. By easing its acceptance criteria a bank faces a trade-off between attracting more demand for loans, thus making higher per period profits, and a deterioration of the quality of its loan portfolio, thus tolerating a higher risk of failure. Our main results state that more stringent capital adequacy requirements lead banks to set stricter acceptance criteria, and that increased competition in the banking industry leads to riskier bank behavior. In an extension of our basic model, we show that it may be beneficial for a bank to hold more equity than prescribed by the regulator, even though holding equity is more expensive than attracting deposits.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=17116
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 04/11.

as in new window
Length: 26
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:04/11

Contact details of provider:
Postal: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA
Phone: (202) 623-7000
Fax: (202) 623-4661
Email:
Web page: http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/pubs/ord_info.htm

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Cordella, Tito & Levy Yeyati, Eduardo, 1998. "Public Disclosure and Bank Failures," CEPR Discussion Papers 1886, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 1997. "Microeconomics of Banking," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061937, December.
  3. Petersen, Mitchell A & Rajan, Raghuram G, 1995. "The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending Relationships," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(2), pages 407-43, May.
  4. Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren, 1993. "The Capital Crunch: Neither A Borrower Nor A Lender Be," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 243, Boston College Department of Economics.
  5. Perotti, Enrico C & Suarez, Javier, 2001. "Last Bank Standing: What Do I Gain if You Fail?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2933, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Matutes, Carmen & Vives, Xavier, 1995. "Imperfect Competition, Risk Taking, and Regulation in Banking," CEPR Discussion Papers 1177, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Stephen F. LeRoy, 1990. "Mutual deposit insurance," FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue jun8.
  8. Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V, 1998. "The Economics of Bank Regulation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(4), pages 745-70, November.
  9. C. H. Furfine, 2000. "Evidence on the response of US banks to changes in capital requirements," BIS Working Papers 88, Bank for International Settlements.
  10. Jokivuolle, Esa & Kauko, Karlo, 2001. "The New Basel Accord: some potential implications of the new standards for credit risk," Research Discussion Papers 2/2001, Bank of Finland.
  11. repec:fth:bfdipa:2/2001 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Gary Gorton & Andrew Winton, 1995. "Bank Capital Regulation in General Equilibrium," NBER Working Papers 5244, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Skander Van den Heuvel, 2006. "The Bank Capital Channel of Monetary Policy," 2006 Meeting Papers 512, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  14. Chu, Kam Hon, 1999. "Free Banking and Information Asymmetry," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 31(4), pages 748-62, November.
  15. Peter J.G. Vlaar, 2000. "Capital requirements and competition in banking industry," Working Paper Series WP-00-18, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  16. P.J.G. Vlaar, 2000. "Capital requirements and competition in the banking industry," WO Research Memoranda (discontinued) 634, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  17. repec:fth:bfdipa:21/00 is not listed on IDEAS
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. W. Bolt & A.F. Tieman, 2001. "When Basle II doesn't work: Contingency Rules versus Fixed Requirements," WO Research Memoranda (discontinued) 681, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  2. A.F. Tieman, 2003. "Spillover of Domestic Regulation to Emerging Markets," DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) 90, Netherlands Central Bank.
  3. Goetz von Peter, 2004. "Asset Prices and Banking Distress: A Macroeconomic Approach," Finance 0411034, EconWPA.
  4. Tatiana Damjanovic & Vladislav Damjanovic & Charles Nolan, 2012. "Universal banking, competition and risk in a macro model," Discussion Papers 1201, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
  5. Brissimis, Sophocles N. & Delis, Manthos D. & Papanikolaou, Nikolaos I., 2008. "Exploring the nexus between banking sector reform and performance: Evidence from newly acceded EU countries," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(12), pages 2674-2683, December.
  6. Tatiana Damjanovic & Vladislav Damjanovic & Charles Nolan, 2013. "Universal vs separated banking with deposit insurance in a macro model," Discussion Papers 1308, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
  7. Chen, Xiaofen, 2007. "Banking deregulation and credit risk: Evidence from the EU," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 356-390, March.
  8. Leo de Haan & Jan Kakes, 2007. "Are non-risk based capital requirements for insurance companies binding?," DNB Working Papers 145, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  9. Agoraki, Maria-Eleni K. & Delis, Manthos D. & Pasiouras, Fotios, 2011. "Regulations, competition and bank risk-taking in transition countries," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 38-48, January.
  10. Wilko Bolt & Alexander F. Tieman, 2006. "On Myopic Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Endogenous Discounting," IMF Working Papers 06/302, International Monetary Fund.
  11. International Monetary Fund, 2008. "Innovation in Banking and Excessive Loan Growth," IMF Working Papers 08/188, International Monetary Fund.
  12. Jakob Bosma, 2011. "Communicating Bailout Policy and Risk Taking in the Banking Industry," DNB Working Papers 277, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  13. von Peter, Goetz, 2009. "Asset prices and banking distress: A macroeconomic approach," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 298-319, September.
  14. Murinde, Victor & Zhao, Tianshu, 2009. "Bank competition, risk taking and productive efficiency: Evidence from Nigeria's banking reform experiments," Stirling Economics Discussion Papers 2009-23, University of Stirling, Division of Economics.
  15. Carletti, Elena & Hartmann, Philipp, 2002. "Competition and stability: what's special about banking?," Working Paper Series 0146, European Central Bank.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:04/11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jim Beardow) or (Hassan Zaidi).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.