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Inflation Performance and Constitutional Central Bank Independence: Evidence From Latin America and the Caribbean

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Author Info
Eva Gutierrez
Abstract

This paper explores the relationship between the constitutional entrenchment of central bank independence and inflation performance. Empirical studies for developing countries have not found a relationship between central bank independence, proxied by the "de jure" independence established in the central bank law, and inflation. We argue that the constitution is likely to be better enforced than ordinary statutes owing to its higher legal rank. Our empirical analysis finds that in a sample of Latin American and Caribbean countries, those countries that entrench the independence of the central bank in the constitution have a better inflation performance.

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Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 03/53.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 04 Apr 2003
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Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:03/53

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Keywords: Central banks ; Latin America ; Inflation ; Central bank role ;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Mangano, Gabriel, 1998. "Measuring Central Bank Independence: A Tale of Subjectivity and of Its Consequences," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 468-92, July.
  2. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B, 1995. "Political Influence on the Central Bank: International Evidence," World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(3), pages 397-423, September.
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  3. Loungani, Prakash & Sheets, Nathan, 1997. "Central Bank Independence, Inflation, and Growth in Transition Economies," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(3), pages 381-99, August.
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  4. Andersen, Torben M. & Schneider, Friedrich, 1986. "Coordination of fiscal and monetary policy under different institutional arrangements," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 169-191. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Berger, Helge & Haan, Jakob de & Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W, 2000. "Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(3), pages 353-98, September.
  7. Eijffinger, S-C-W & de Haan, J, 1996. "The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence," Princeton Studies in International Economics 19, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Montiel, Peter & Serven, Luis, 2004. "Macroeconomic stability in developing countries - How much is enough?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3456, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. JoAnne Morris & Tonny Lybek, 2004. "Central Bank Governance: A Survey of Boards and Management," IMF Working Papers 04/226, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  3. Domac, Ilker, 2004. "Explaining and forecasting inflation in Tukey," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3287, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  4. Alex Cukierman, 2006. "Central Bank Independence and Monetary Policymaking Institutions: Past, Present, and Future," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 360, Central Bank of Chile. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Ashoka Mody & Franziska Ohnsorge, 2007. "Can Domestic Policies Influence Inflation?," IMF Working Papers 07/257, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  6. Ilker Domac, 2003. "Explaining and Forecasting Inflation in Turkey," Working Papers 0306, Research and Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. [Downloadable!]
  7. Ilker Domac & Eray M. Yucel, 2003. "What Triggers Inflation in Emerging Market Economies?," Working Papers 0307, Research and Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-20.


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