Crisis in Competitive versus Monopolistic Banking Systems
AbstractWe study a monetary, general equilibrium economy in which banks exist because they provide intertemporal insurance to risk-averse depositors. A "banking crisis" is defined as a case in which banks exhaust their reserve assets. Under different model specifications, the banking industry is either a monopoly bank or a competitive banking industry. If the nominal rate of interest (rate of inflation) is below (above) some threshold, a monopolistic banking system will always result in a higher (lower) crisis probability. Thus, the relative crisis probabilities under the two banking systems cannot be determined independently of the conduct of monetary policy. We further show that the probability of a "costly banking crisis" is always higher under competition than under monopoly. However, this apparent advantage of the monopoly bank is due strictly to the fact that it provides relatively less valuable intertemporal insurance. These theoretical results suggest that banking system structure may matter for financial stability.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 03/188.
Date of creation: 01 Sep 2003
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA
Phone: (202) 623-7000
Fax: (202) 623-4661
Web page: http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- John H. Boyd & Gianni De Nicoló & Bruce D. Smith, 2004. "Crises in competitive versus monopolistic banking systems," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 487-509.
- Boyd, John H & De Nicolo, Gianni & Smith, Bruce D, 2004. "Crises in Competitive versus Monopolistic Banking Systems," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 36(3), pages 487-506, June.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gianni De NicolÃ³ & M. G. Zephirin & Philip F. Bartholomew & Jahanara Zaman, 2003. "Bank Consolidation, Internationalization and Conglomeration: Trends and Implications for Financial Risk," IMF Working Papers 03/158, International Monetary Fund.
- John H. Boyd & Chun Chang & Bruce D. Smith, 1998.
"Deposit insurance: a reconsideration,"
593, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Champ, B. & Smith, B.D., 1991.
"Currency Elasticity and Banking Panics: theory and Evidence,"
University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations Working Papers
9109, University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations.
- Bruce Champ & Bruce D. Smith & Stephen D. Williamson, 1996. "Currency Elasticity and Banking Panics: Theory and Evidence," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(4), pages 828-64, November.
- Champ, B. & Snith, B.D. & Williamson, D.S., 1991. "Currency Elasticity and Banking Panics: Theory and Evidence," RCER Working Papers 292, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- John H. Boyd & Pedro Gomis-Porqueras & Sungkyu Kwak & Bruce David Smith, 2014.
"A User's Guide to Banking Crises,"
Annals of Economics and Finance,
Society for AEF, vol. 15(2), pages 800-892, November.
- Bruce D. Smith, 2002. "Monetary Policy, Banking Crises, and the Friedman Rule," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(2), pages 128-134, May.
- Kevin C. Murdock & Thomas F. Hellmann & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2000. "Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 147-165, March.
- Nicola Cetorelli & Pietro Peretto, 2010.
"Credit Quantity and Credit Quality: Bank Competition and Capital Accumulation,"
10-65, Duke University, Department of Economics.
- Cetorelli, Nicola & Peretto, Pietro F., 2012. "Credit quantity and credit quality: Bank competition and capital accumulation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 967-998.
- Nicola Cetorelli & Pietro F. Peretto, 2009. "Credit quantity and credit quality: bank competition and capital accumulation," Staff Reports 375, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
- CARLETTI, Elena & LEONELLO, Agnese, 2012. "Credit Market Competition and Liquidity Crises," Economics Working Papers ECO2012/14, European University Institute.
- David R. Skeie, 2008.
"Banking with nominal deposits and inside money,"
242, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
- Uhde, André & Heimeshoff, Ulrich, 2009.
"Consolidation in banking and financial stability in Europe: empirical evidence,"
IWQW Discussion Paper Series
02/2009, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik und Quantitative Wirtschaftsforschung (IWQW).
- Uhde, André & Heimeshoff, Ulrich, 2009. "Consolidation in banking and financial stability in Europe: Empirical evidence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(7), pages 1299-1311, July.
- Marcella Lucchetta & Gianni De NicolÃ³, 2011.
"Bank Competition and Financial Stability: A General Equilibrium Exposition,"
IMF Working Papers
11/295, International Monetary Fund.
- Gianni De Nicolò & Marcella Lucchetta, 2013. "Bank Competition and Financial Stability: A General Equilibrium Exposition," CESifo Working Paper Series 4123, CESifo Group Munich.
- Benjamin Miranda Tabak & Guilherme Maia Rodrigues Gomes & Maurício da Silva Medeiros Júnior, 2012. "The Impact of Market Power at Bank Level in Risk-taking: the Brazilian case," Working Papers Series 283, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
- Brissimis, Sophocles N. & Delis, Manthos D., 2011.
"Bank-level estimates of market power,"
European Journal of Operational Research,
Elsevier, vol. 212(3), pages 508-517, August.
- Martin CihÃ¡k & Simon Wolfe & Klaus Schaeck, 2006. "Are More Competitive Banking Systems More Stable?," IMF Working Papers 06/143, International Monetary Fund.
- Sergio SANFILIPPO AZOFRA & Maria CANTERO SAIZ & Begona TORRE OLMO & Carlos LOPEZ GUTIERREZ, 2013. "Financial Crises, Concentration and Efficiency: Effects on Performance and Risk of Banks," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 63(6), pages 537-558, December.
- Ghossoub, Edgar A., 2012. "Liquidity risk and financial competition: Implications for asset prices and monetary policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 155-173.
- Müller, Oliver & Uhde, André, 2013. "Cross-border bank lending: Empirical evidence on new determinants from OECD banking markets," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 136-162.
- Hasan, Iftekhar & Marinc , Matej, 2013. "Should competition policy in banking be amended during crises? Lessons from the EU," Research Discussion Papers 7/2013, Bank of Finland.
- Matsuoka, Tarishi, 2013. "Sunspot bank runs in competitive versus monopolistic banking systems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 247-249.
- Samantas, Ioannis, 2013. "Bank competition and financial (in)stability in Europe: A sensitivity analysis," MPRA Paper 51621, University Library of Munich, Germany.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jim Beardow) or (Hassan Zaidi).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.