Reconciling Stability and Growth: Smart Pacts and Structural Reforms
AbstractThis paper analyzes the decision by a government facing electoral uncertainty to implement structural reforms in the presence of fiscal restraints similar to the Stability and Growth Pact. To the extent that the reform package entails budgetary costs, the model shows that a fiscal pact erodes incentives to carry out structural reforms, sacrificing future growth for present stability. Although the pact effectively addresses the deficit bias resulting from electoral uncertainty, the induced reduction in reforms implies ambiguous welfare effects. We conclude that a "smart" (i.e., welfare-improving) pact should take into account the budgetary effects of structural reforms. Our conclusions are consistent with the actual principles guiding the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 03/174.
Date of creation: 01 Sep 2003
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Other versions of this item:
- Roel M. W. J. Beetsma & Xavier Debrun, 2004. "Reconciling Stability and Growth: Smart Pacts and Structural Reforms," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 51(3), pages 431-456, November.
- Beetsma, Roel & Debrun, Xavier, 2003. "Reconciling Stability and Growth: Smart Pacts and Structural Reforms," CEPR Discussion Papers 3930, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-02-16 (All new papers)
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