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What Happens After Supervisory Intervention? Considering Bank Closure Options

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Author Info
Michael Andrews
Mats Josefsson
Abstract

Closures have been used to resolve problem banks in many countries in a wide range of economic circumstances, yet banking supervisors frequently defer intervention and closure. Avoiding the costs of disruption is the principal argument in favor of extraordinary measures, such as the use of public funds for recapitalization or forbearance, as alternatives to closing insolvent banks. Well-planned and implemented closure options can preserve essential functions performed by failing banks, mitigating disruption. Extraordinary measures to avoid closure should generally be avoided, but may be used in a systemic crisis to preserve some portion of a widely insolvent banking sector.

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Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 03/17.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 21 Feb 2003
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Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:03/17

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Related research
Keywords: Bank supervision ; Bank restructuring ; Deposit insurance ;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Tamim Bayoumi & Paul R. Masson, 1998. "Market-Based Policy Instruments for Systemic Bank Restructuring," IMF Working Papers 98/113, International Monetary Fund.
  2. Gerard Caprio, Jr. and Patrick Honohan, 2008. "Banking Crises," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp242, IIIS. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Edward J. Frydl, 1999. "The Length and Cost of Banking Crises," IMF Working Papers 99/30, International Monetary Fund.
  4. Paul Hoffman & Anthony M. Santomero, 1998. "Problem Bank Resolution: Evaluating the Options," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 98-05, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
  5. Dong He, 2000. "Emergency Liquidity Support Facilities," IMF Working Papers 00/79, International Monetary Fund.
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-30.


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