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Sovereign Bond Restructuring: Collective Action Clauses and Official Crisis Intervention

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Author Info
Kenneth Kletzer

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Abstract

This paper compares the restructuring of sovereign bonds with and without collective action clauses. One conclusion is that collective action clauses can allow efficient debt renegotiation in a formal model of sovereign debt renegotiation while unanimity rules offer incentives for opportunistic behavior by bondholders that leads to inefficient outcomes. With collective action clauses, the mutual gains from renegotiation can be internalized by bondholders so that the holders of each bond issue have incentives to participate in a collective debt restructuring. The analysis abstracts from transactions costs, and the last conclusion might well be sensitive to renegotiation and coordination costs.

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Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 03/134.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 17 Jul 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:03/134

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Keywords: Bonds Debt restructuring Collective action clauses

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Wells, Robin, 1993. "Tolerance of Arrearages: How IMF Loan Policy Can Effect Debt Reduction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 621-33, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Marcus Miller & Joseph Stiglitz, 1999. "Bankruptcy Protection Against Macroeconomics Shocks: The case for a 'super Chapter 11'," CSGR Hot Topics: Research on Current Issues 08, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR), University of Warwick. [Downloadable!]
  3. Atkeson, Andrew, 1991. "International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1069-89, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Buiter, Willem H & Sibert, Anne, 1999. "UDROP: A Small Contribution to the New International Financial Architecture," CEPR Discussion Papers 2138, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 155-78, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Yunyong Thaicharoen & Törbjörn I. Becker & Anthony J. Richards, 2001. "Bond Restructuring and Moral Hazard: Are Collective Action Clauses Costly?," IMF Working Papers 01/92, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Thomas, Jonathan & Worrall, Tim, 1990. "Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 367-390, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Fernandez, Raquel & Rosenthal, Robert W, 1990. "Strategic Models of Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(3), pages 331-49, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Andrew G Haldane & Gregor Irwin & Victoria Saporta, . "Bail out or work out? Theoretical considerations," Bank of England working papers 219, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
  2. Barry Eichengreen & Kenneth Kletzer & Ashoka Mody, 2003. "Crisis resolution: next steps," Pacific Basin Working Paper Series 03-05, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Issam Hallak, 2003. "Courts and Sovereign Eurobonds: Credibility of the Judicial Enforcement of Repayment," CFS Working Paper Series 2003/34, Center for Financial Studies. [Downloadable!]
  4. Andrew G Haldane & Adrian Penalver & Victoria Saporta & Hyun Song Shin, . "Optimal collective action clause thresholds," Bank of England working papers 249, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
  5. Andrew G Haldane & Adrian Penalver & Victoria Saporta & Hyun Song Shin, . "Analytics of sovereign debt restructuring," Bank of England working papers 203, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
  6. Kenneth Kletzer, 2004. "Sovereign Debt, Volatility and Insurance," Santa Cruz Center for International Economics, Working Paper Series 1043, Center for International Economics, UC Santa Cruz. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Kenneth Kletzer, 2006. "International Financial Integration, Sovereignty, and Constraints on Macroeconomic Policies," IMF Working Papers 06/79, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. José Wynne & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2004. "Renegotiation, Collective Action Clauses and Sovereign Debt Markets," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 153, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Federico Sturzenegger & Punan Chuham, 2003. "Default`s in the 1990`s: What have we learned?"," Business School Working Papers seis, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. [Downloadable!]
  10. Esteban Jadresic & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Rodrigo Valdés, 2003. "Crisis Financieras Internacionales, Prestamista de Última Instancia y Nueva Arquitectura Financiera Internacional," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 212, Central Bank of Chile. [Downloadable!]
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