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Toward a Statutory Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Lessons from Corporate Bankruptcy Practice around the World

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Author Info
Patrick Bolton
Abstract

This paper provides an overview of key elements of Corporate Bankruptcy Codes and Practice around the world that are relevant to the debate on Sovereign Debt Restructuring. It highlights four components common to most bankruptcy reorganization institutions: a stay on debt collection efforts to prevent a costly run for the assets, broad enforcement of absolute priority, majority voting among creditors on the proposed reorganization plan, and new higher priority financing to keep the firm going while its liabilities are restructured. The paper argues that these components ought to be present in any sovereign debt restructuring procedure.

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Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 03/13.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 13 Feb 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:03/13

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Related research
Keywords: Debt restructuring ; Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism ;

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Buiter, Willem H & Sibert, Anne C, 1999. "UDROP: A Contribution to the New International Financial Architecture," International Finance, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 2(2), pages 227-47, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Michael P. Dooley, 2000. "Can Output Losses Following International Financial Crises be Avoided?," NBER Working Papers 7531, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Philippe Aghion & Oliver D. Hart & John Moore, 1994. "The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform," NBER Chapters, in: Transition in Eastern Europe, Volume 2, The, pages 215-244 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Rowat, M. & Astigarraga, J., 1999. "Latin American Insolvency Systems. A Comparative Assessment," Papers 433, World Bank - Technical Papers.
  5. Detragiache, Enrica & Garella, Paolo G., 1996. "Debt Restructuring with Multiple Creditors and the Role of Exchange Offers," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 305-336, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Buiter, Willem H & Sibert, Anne, 1999. "UDROP: A Small Contribution to the New International Financial Architecture," CEPR Discussion Papers 2138, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Jeanne, Olivier & Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, 2001. "International Bailouts, Moral Hazard, and Conditionality," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Eichengreen, Barry & Ruehl, Christoph, 2000. "The Bail-In Problem: Systematic Goals, Ad Hoc Means," CEPR Discussion Papers 2427, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Robert Gertner & David Scharfstein, 1991. "A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Law," NBER Technical Working Papers 0103, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Yunyong Thaicharoen & Törbjörn I. Becker & Anthony J. Richards, 2001. "Bond Restructuring and Moral Hazard: Are Collective Action Clauses Costly?," IMF Working Papers 01/92, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Jeremy Bulow, 2002. "First World Governments and Third World Debt: A Bankruptcy Court for Sovereign Lending?," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 33(2002-1), pages 229-256. [Downloadable!]
  12. Hal S. Scott, 2002. "How Would a New Bankruptcy Regime Help?," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 33(2002-1), pages 334-340. [Downloadable!]
  13. Franks, Julian R & Torous, Walter N, 1989. " An Empirical Investigation of U.S. Firms in Reorganization," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 44(3), pages 747-69, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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